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Summer of 2020 represented a potentially pivotal moment in the
movements against mass incarceration and for racial justice. The authors
commenced a study of Baltimore’s pretrial legal system just as the
convergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and urgent cries of Black Lives
Matter appeared to present a once-in-a-generation opportunity for
meaningful decarceration. Over forty-four weekdays in June and July, the
team observed bail review hearings in 509 cases and collected extensive data
from the arguments and recommendations offered by the pretrial agency and
prosecuting and defense attorneys. Unfortunately, the hoped-for reform
failed to materialize as judges held nearly 62% of all defendants “without
bail,” sending detainees back to jail indefinitely despite the pandemic and
despite their legal presumption of innocence. Even worse, stark racial
inequalities persisted.
This Article argues that the failed reform of Baltimore’s pretrial legal
system represents a larger triumph of structural racism and that nothing
short of radical transformation of the body politic will end such systemic
racism. After describing the original empirical study, presenting a critical
history of pretrial justice struggles in Maryland, and relating representative
narratives of detainee experiences, the Article employs a novel analysis that
reveals a basic pattern of structural injustice replicating itself, like DNA in
cells. When plotting the addresses of study defendants onto maps of
Baltimore, the unmistakable pattern of a butterfly emerges. This evokes the
vital work of Dr. Lawrence Brown who has famously observed that
“hypersegregation” in Baltimore looks like a Black butterfly. The Black
butterfly represents the physical manifestation of systemic racism; it reveals
a pattern of inequality that cuts across economic, political, and other sociocultural systems.
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Using data from the Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance, this
Article visualizes the connection between pretrial injustice and structural
racism through a series of original computer-generated maps. These maps
connect neighborhood indicators measuring racial composition, median
household income, transportation services, access to home Internet, and
other non-criminal markers of advantage and disadvantage to the stories of
individual criminal defendants from the Article’s study. The contours of the
Black butterfly continuously re-appear, suggesting an inextricable
relationship between judicial institutions of “criminal justice” and
institutions meting out economic, political, and socio-cultural opportunity.
Though it is dispiriting that unequal pretrial detention continued
relentlessly in Baltimore despite the pandemic and then-Chief Judge
Barbera’s call for racial justice, Baltimore’s experience in the time of
COVID exemplifies the challenges faced everywhere by those seeking to
dismantle structures of racism. Lessons learned from Baltimore apply to the
entire nation. Ultimately, analysis of the butterfly in the time of COVID
underscores the necessity of connecting all reform efforts aimed at
confronting inequality across all domains. Indeed, structural racism has a
Hydra-like quality. If you ignore the body and simply cut off one head, two
will grow back in its place. Only Herculean focus and a willingness to burn
out injustice across the whole monster can lead to meaningful change.
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INTRODUCTION
In discourse where participants accept “structural racism”1 as a given,
but debate how best to confront its harmful reality, two conceptual metaphors
1. “Structural racism” is a phrase used very differently by different people when discussing
racism at a systemic/institutional level. Rather than provide a neat analytic definition of the term,
we initially use scare quotes to emphasize the concept’s messy and contested meaning. We then
consider how competing conceptions of structural racism affect debates over how best to confront
systemic inequality.
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compete.2 These competing metaphors operate below the surface of debate,
shaping collective intuitions about the concept of “structural racism” and how
it affects society.3 Competing intuitions about how structural racism affects
society, in turn, suggest different strategies for ending the phenomenon. In
other words, the two metaphors for structural racism—a concept with other
labels including “institutional racism” or “systemic racism”—inspire
disputes over possible solutions to overcome the stubborn persistence of
American inequality.
The first metaphor regards structural racism as a virus that attacks an
otherwise healthy body politic. Per the virus metaphor, although our social
body seeks to live by ideals of democracy, fairness, and equality, its organs
sometimes become infected by racist disease. To fight a foe thus conceived,
this metaphor supports intuitions about strategies like inoculation (think:
diversity training) or isolation and quarantine (find bad actors, remove them
from the system). Since targeted interventions effectively curb viruses, those
who subconsciously embrace the virus metaphor are sanguine about the
prospects of focused, incremental efforts to heal the wounds of racism. The
virus metaphor dominates at the back of much liberal reform discourse.
The second metaphor alternatively conceives racism as embedded in our
systemic DNA. Rather than a foreign virus attacking a body committed to
equality, this competing metaphor regards inequality as inherent in the
cellular structure of American capitalist society’s founding institutions. As
the cells of founding generations divided and American institutions

2. This Article aims to engage deeply with those who accept the premise of structural racism’s
existence and normative inequity. Paraphrasing Aristotle, those who deny the existence of structural
racism need perception rather than argument. Cf. CHAIM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA,
THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 56 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver
trans., 1969) (“Not every problem, not every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might
puzzle one of those who need argument, not . . . perception. For people . . . who are puzzled to know
whether snow is white or not need perception.” (quoting 1 ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 11, 105a (W.A.
Pickard-Cambridge trans., 350 B.C.))). Academic freedom is a different matter. See Andrew
Koppelman, Scandalous Suppression at a Law Review, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 12, 2022),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/scandalous-suppression-at-a-law-review
(commenting
on
controversy surrounding a law review’s decision to withdraw the publication of an article skeptical
to systemic racism). In our view, our readers will benefit more from time spent in a conversation on
confronting racial injustice rather than in one questioning its conceptual legitimacy.
3. Using the framework made famous by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, “structural
racism” can be understood as a conceptual metaphor. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980). This is to say that the words “structural racism”
describe a cognitive concept, not a sensorial phenomenon that can be “tasted, touched, seen, heard,
or smelled.” See Amy E. Sloan & Colin Starger, Essay, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Metaphor and
Legal Research, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 1, 8 n.38 (2017) (positing “law” as a conceptual
metaphor). As a higher order complex metaphor, structural racism is necessarily understood through
other lower-order conceptual metaphors. See id. at 7 (describing the “concept-building-throughmetaphor process”). Identifying conceptual metaphors helps flag “situations where conceptual
change is needed” to overcome “hidden metaphors [that] potentially calcify thinking and stifle
innovation.” Id. at 8.
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multiplied, racism was inherited and remains an essential trait. Those whose
conceptions of structural racism align with the DNA metaphor intuit that
nothing short of wholesale transformation of the body politic will end
systemic inequality. Strategies suggested under the logic of the DNA
metaphor include overthrowing institutions (think: defund and abolish) and
establishing entirely new narratives (begin with 1619 not 1776). Radical
progressive discourse tends to embrace the DNA metaphor.
Since conceptual metaphors usually operate below the surface of
articulated debate, those embracing different metaphors for structural racism
often talk past each other and may become exasperated by opponents
proceeding under incompatible intuitions. This can happen despite all
participants in a particular dispute agreeing on institutional racism’s
existence and normative inequity. Put simply: When people conceive of
reality differently, they will disagree on what is realistic. Those guided by
the virus metaphor, for example, might regard proposals like abolishing the
police or convening a new constitutional convention as outright magical
thinking. Conversely, those guided by the DNA metaphor might hear
proposals for incremental reform as insane calls to repeat failed behavior and
hope for a different outcome. Unfortunately, when the very rationality of
discursive participants comes into question, productive dialog can break
down.
This Article seeks to contribute to productive dialog around structural
racism within a city’s pretrial detention and over-incarceration system, while
ultimately defending a position consistent with the DNA metaphor. Yet we
do not deride the reform logic that regards systemic inequality as a malignant
disease requiring focused treatment. In point of fact, this Article had its
genesis in an empirical project to study a once-in-a-generation opportunity to
reform a city’s pretrial legal institution profoundly infected by structural
racism. The incremental reform solution suggested by the virus metaphor
seemed possible and this Article’s authors were optimistic. But when reform
floundered,4 critical analysis of the study’s results demonstrated how
subconscious acceptance of the virus metaphor’s logic had obscured clear
thinking. The reform’s failure to account for the interconnected systems,
processes, and norms structuring the reproduction of racism had likely
doomed the focused treatment approach from the start. Only after reflection
did the DNA metaphor emerge as a better fit for the evidence observed.

4. See infra notes 67–77 and accompanying text (detailing results of study); cf. Donna M.
Owens, Baltimore Rising: Two Years After Freddie Gray’s Death, Shaken City Mends, NBC NEWS
(Apr. 19, 2017, 1:52 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/city-dividedbaltimore-mending-two-years-after-freddie-grays-death-n748101 (detailing how efforts to reform
and improve the administration of criminal justice after the uprising in response to Freddie Gray’s
killing in Baltimore failed, despite expanded funding from the state and federal government and
broad promises by city leaders).
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To vindicate the proposition that nothing short of radical transformation
of the body politic will end systemic racism, this Article first reports on its
original empirical study and then analyzes the study’s results using a novel
method rooted in geography, data, and computer code, as well as in narrative
storytelling.5 This analysis reveals a basic pattern of structural racism and
injustice replicating itself—like DNA in cells—over and over. Though the
specific injustices chronicled in this Article occurred in the realm of the
criminal legal system (the domain in which this Article’s authors are
“experts”6), the replicated pattern of inequality cut across disparate domains
and institutions. This finding leads to the conclusion that narrow institutionspecific efforts to confront structural racism inevitably will fail. What’s more,
the cross-domain nature of structural phenomena suggests that academic
specialization, the dominant model of scholarly knowledge production,
might also inhibit meaningful change. It is time to step out of our lanes,
collaborate, and connect the dots.
This Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I tells the story of the original “in our lane” study and the hope for
successful reform. The general object of examination is Baltimore’s so-called
“criminal justice system” with specific focus on the city’s pretrial legal
system. The pretrial system determines whether presumptively innocent
criminal defendants are detained, released, or required to pay bail after
charging but before resolution by trial or plea. This system serves as the
“front door” to Maryland’s larger mass incarceration apparatus, which has
long been criticized for its disproportionate impact on Black Marylanders.7
Critically, the study began in 2020 at a potentially pivotal moment in the

5. Data and the computer code used to analyze and visualize these data are available on an
open-source GitHub repository. See Colin Starger, A Butterfly in COVID: Structural Racism and
Baltimore’s Pretrial Legal System Code Supporting Article Analysis and Images, GITHUB (Oct. 24,
2022,
8:31
PM)
[hereinafter
Jupyter
Notebook],
https://github.com/Colinstarger/Butterfly_in_COVID_Spring22/blob/master/Black_Butterfly_Sp2
2_public.ipynb. Providing data and code facilitates verification of reported results and encourages
continued collaboration. To protect privacy, all the defendant names in the publicly available data
are pseudonyms.
6. Though the authors do not lack bona fides, see infra note 43, we acknowledge the perils of
academic specialization and worry that exalting “expertise” can inhibit discourse and reproduce
educational inequality.
7. See infra note 42; Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right
to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Colbert, Illusory Right to
Counsel]; Douglas L. Colbert, Coming Soon to a Court Near You—Convicting the Unrepresented
at the Bail Stage: An Autopsy of a State High Court’s Sua Sponte Rejection of Indigent Defendants’
Right to Counsel, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 653 (2006) [hereinafter Colbert, Convicting the
Unrepresented]; Doug Colbert, Opinion, Justice Before the Trial, BALT. SUN (Sept. 6, 2010, 12:00
AM) [hereinafter Colbert, Justice Before the Trial], https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/bsxpm-2010-09-06-bs-ed-pretrial-incarceration-20100906-story.html.
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movements against mass incarceration and for racial justice.8 After the
COVID crisis created pressure to decarcerate, then-Chief Judge Barbera
issued an order encouraging reduction in jailed populations.9 Meanwhile, the
intense national conversation triggered by George Floyd’s murder and
ensuing protests created pressure to address systemic racism.10
Though the potential for reform appeared profound, this Part reports that
reform failed to fully materialize. Over the course of two months, the study
observed 509 bail hearings where pretrial incarceration decisions were
made.11 Remarkably, 61.5% of all defendants were “held without bail”
(“HWOB”).12 In other words, nearly two out of three defendants were
subjected to preventive detention and sent back to jail indefinitely with no
opportunity for freedom until trial, despite the pandemic, despite a judicial
order encouraging reduced incarceration numbers, and despite their legal
presumption of innocence.13 While this statistical reality caused disbelief and
dismay, individual instances of injustice shocked the conscience. Time and
again, pretrial detention orders were given in cases where such an outcome
seemed unjustified and unnecessary.14 Part I highlights some individual
stories to remind the reader of the human cost of abstract policy decisions.15

8. See, e.g., VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUST. POL’Y INST., RACE AND
INCARCERATION
IN
MARYLAND
(2003),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/uploads/cdfec26d-fca4-4b44-9f4298c71ff5a893/finalmrd.pdf;
Maryland
Profile,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/MD.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2022); Kelly Broderick,
University of Maryland Report Details Racial Justice in Prosecution in Baltimore City, WMAR 2
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2022, 5:56 PM), https://www.wmar2news.com/news/local-news/university-ofmaryland-report-details-racial-justice-in-prosecution-in-baltimore-city (detailing a February 2022
report by the University of Maryland on racial justice in the state).
9. See In the Court of Appeals of Maryland Administrative Order Guiding the Response of the
Trial Courts of Maryland to the COVID-19 Emergency as it Relates to Those Persons who are
Incarcerated or Imprisoned, MD. JUDICIARY (April 14, 2020) [hereinafter Order Guiding the
Response
of
the
Trial
Courts],
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/adminorders/20200414guidingresponseoftrialcourts.pdf.
10. See George Floyd Death: Violence Erupts on Sixth Day of Protests, BBC NEWS (June 1,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52872401; Protests Across the Globe After
George
Floyd’s
Death,
CNN
(June
13,
2020,
3:22
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-george-floyd-protests/index.html;
Matt
Furber, Audra D.S. Burch & Frances Robles, What Happened in the Chaotic Moments Before
George Floyd Died, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/derekchauvin-george-floyd-worked-together.html.
11. See infra Section I.A; Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 11.
12. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 12; see also infra notes 71–76 and accompanying
text.
13. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
14. See infra Section I.A.
15. See infra Section I.B.
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Part II turns to consider why meaningful reform failed to materialize.16
It begins by placing the dashed promise of 2020 into the context of the
Maryland pretrial domain’s long history of setbacks and frustrated reform.
Stepping back from the pretrial domain, this Part then reflects on a key
finding from the empirical study: 83.1% of all defendants observed in the
Baltimore study were Black while only 12.4% were white.17 Per the 2020
Census, Baltimore is 57.3% Black and 26.9% white.18 While pretrial actors
were not responsible for this severe racial imbalance—judges did not make
the arrests that resulted in 83% of pretrial defendants being Black in a 57%
Black city—they were nonetheless complicit in reproducing the structural
inequality presented to them.19 This initially suggests that a narrow domainfocused approach might miss the big picture of systemic racism.
Part II then introduces a method to grasp the big-picture hinted at by the
study’s finding of baseline inequality—geospatial mapping.20 Plotting
defendant home addresses atop regional and Baltimore City maps reveals a
striking pattern:

16. See infra Section II.A.
17. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 13. Maryland’s catch-all “Other/Unknown” category
accounted for the remaining 4.5%. Id.
18. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 14 (collecting 2020 Census data from Baltimore
Neighborhood Indicators Alliance API). Census data further indicates that Baltimore is 7.8%
Hispanic, 3.6% Asian, 3.6% two or more races, and 0.8% all other races. Id.
19. See infra notes 145–147 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Section II.B.
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Figure 1
Defendant Home Address Dispersion
(Regional and Baltimore City)21

On the maps, the unmistakable shape of a black butterfly emerges. This
evokes the vital work of Dr. Lawrence Brown who has famously observed
that “hypersegregation” in Baltimore looks like a butterfly.22 Per Dr. Brown,
the butterfly shape shows “where Black Baltimoreans are geographically
clustered [and] where capital is denied and structural disadvantages have
accumulated due to the lack of capital access.”23 The Black butterfly is thus
the physical manifestation of systemic racism; it suggests a deeper pattern of
inequality that cuts across economic, political, and other social-cultural

21. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 17 (mapping defendant addresses reported during
bail review hearings).
22. See LAWRENCE T. BROWN, THE BLACK BUTTERFLY: THE HARMFUL POLITICS OF RACE
AND SPACE IN AMERICA (2021) [hereinafter BROWN, BLACK BUTTERFLY]; see also Lawrence
Brown, Two Baltimores: The White L vs. the Black Butterfly, BALT. SUN (June 28, 2016, 5:34 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/citypaper/bcpnews-two-baltimores-the-white-l-vs-the-blackbutterfly-20160628-htmlstory.html. Dr. Brown adopts the term “hypersegregation” from the
Massey-Tannen scheme. See BROWN, BLACK BUTTERFLY, supra, at 9 n.15 (citing Douglas S.
Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in Black Hypersegregation, 52
DEMOGRAPHY 1025–34 (2015)).
23. BROWN, BLACK BUTTERFLY, supra note 22, at 9. The structurally disadvantaged parts of
Baltimore form the butterfly’s wings. Structural advantage is conferred upon the butterfly’s “body,”
which Dr. Brown calls the “White L” given the geographic shape’s resemblance to the letter “L.”
Id. at 14 (“[T]he White L is more than a demographic description but a political, economic, and
social-cultural description.”). As Dr. Brown notes, the shape is not rigid. White enclaves exist within
the Black butterfly just as Black enclaves exist in the White L. Id. at 9, 14.
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systems.24 This Part concludes that the Black butterfly offers prima facie
justification for the DNA metaphor of structural racism.
Part III deepens the DNA metaphor’s justification using an innovative
method rooted in geography, data, and computer code. Pairing this Article’s
original empirical research with an extraordinary but underused data source,
the Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance (“BNIA”), this Part presents
a series of original computer-generated maps that graphically illustrate the
replicating patterns of inequality in Baltimore.25 These maps connect
neighborhood indicators measuring racial composition, median household
income, access to home Internet, and other non-criminal markers of
advantage and disadvantage to the stories of individual criminal defendants
from the Article’s study. The contours of the Black butterfly continuously reappear, suggesting an inextricable relationship between institutions of
“criminal justice” and institutions meting out economic, political, and socialcultural oppression and opportunity. Just as a targeted medicinal approach
would fail to relieve a genetic condition, efforts to reform criminal legal
institutions that ignore these connections are almost certainly doomed to fail.
Part IV concludes. Though it is grim and dispiriting that unequal pretrial
detention continued relentlessly in Baltimore despite the pandemic and
widespread calls for racial justice, Baltimore’s experience in the time of
COVID exemplifies the challenges faced everywhere by those seeking to
dismantle structures of racism. Lessons learned from Baltimore apply not
only to other hypersegregated cities—Chicago, Detroit, Flint, St. Louis,
Cleveland, Birmingham, Milwaukee26—but also to the entire nation.
Ultimately, analysis of the butterfly in the time of COVID underscores the
necessity of connecting all reform efforts aimed at confronting inequality
across all domains and silos. Bail reform is education reform is economic
reform is housing reform. And so on, and vice versa. Structural racism has a
Hydra-like quality. If you simply cut off one head, two will grow back in its
place. Only Herculean focus and a willingness to burn out injustice across
the whole monster can lead to meaningful change.
I. BALTIMORE PRETRIAL IN THE TIME OF COVID
On Thursday, June 25, 2020, Baltimore District Court Judge Catherine
Chen presided over the bail review hearings in Courtroom Four of the
Wabash Avenue District Court.27 The third defendant called that day was
24. Id.
25. BALT. NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS ALL., https://bniajfi.org/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2022).
26. Dr. Brown identifies these cities, along with Baltimore, as the eight “category 5”
hypersegregated cities in the United States. BROWN, BLACK BUTTERFLY, supra note 22, at 9.
27. Audiotape: Bail Review Hearing, held by the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City,
Judge Catherine Chen (June 25, 2020) (on file with authors) (supporting entire narrative that
follows). The authors’ access to observe bail proceedings was limited to Courtroom Four, aka “Part
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Zoey Griffin,28 a 28-year-old Black man from the southwest of Baltimore.29
As explained by his lawyer, Mr. Griffin had flagged a police car following
tragic events and provided a full statement. This statement explained that Mr.
Griffin had been working as an Uber driver when one of his passengers
robbed him at gunpoint. With a gun pointed at his head, Mr. Griffin lost
control of his car resulting in a pedestrian’s unintended death. Based on
these circumstances, the defense lawyer first argued that her client had been
grossly overcharged. She then explained Mr. Griffin’s perilous health: his
kidney functioned at only 5–10%, he received dialysis three times weekly,
and he currently awaited a transplant operation.
After detailing her client’s mitigating circumstance, defense counsel
turned to the pretrial release question and acknowledged that the seriousness
of a murder charge combined with her client’s 2013 conviction for gun
possession meant that “release on recognizance” (“ROR”) was unlikely.30
Instead, the lawyer urged Judge Chen to release Mr. Griffin on home
detention so that he could continue receiving his needed dialysis treatment.
Despite these extraordinary circumstances and the fact that judges were
under an explicit pandemic directive to “identify at-risk incarcerated persons
for potential release” and to consider the release of adult defendants from
pretrial detention by weighing COVID as a factor,31 Judge Chen was
unfazed. Without pausing to consider defense counsel’s argument, Judge
Chen recited a stock mantra indicating she had considered all factors and
ordered detention for Mr. Griffin, setting the next date for 60 days later.
Three weeks later, Mr. Griffin died while incarcerated, well before his case
was ever adjudicated.32

4,” the primary pretrial courtroom for male defendants charged with serious offenses in Baltimore
City. Other courtrooms hold bail hearings for additional male defendants charged with
misdemeanors and less serious offenses, as well as for female defendants who represent about 10%
of arrestees. This Article’s study took place exclusively in Courtroom Four.
28. Because of the tragic circumstances of his case, we do not use a pseudonym for Mr. Griffin.
Based on his home address, Mr. Griffin came from the Westport/Mount Winans/Lakeland
neighborhood. This neighborhood ranks forty-first out of fifty-five in terms of median household
income, making it one of the city’s poorer areas. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 21–23. Its
median household income in 2019 was approximately $36,000 per year. Id. ¶ 22. By comparison,
the city’s richest neighborhood by this measure (Canton) had a median income of $128,000. Id.
¶¶ 24–25. The poorest neighborhood by this measure (Upton/Druid Heights) had a median income
of $21,000. Id. ¶¶ 26–27.
29. See id. ¶¶ 19–21 (defendant number 215; case number 4B02423005).
30. Based upon the murder charge, both the Maryland Division of Pretrial Detention and
Services in Baltimore City (“Pretrial Services” or “Pretrial”) and the Baltimore City State’s
Attorney’s Office had recommended pretrial detention (also known as “Held Without Bail”) for Mr.
Griffin. See id. ¶ 28.
31. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining April 14, 2020, order by Maryland
Court of Appeals Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera).
32. Obituary of Zoey Sterling Griffin, VAUGHN GREENE FUNERAL SERVS. P.A. (July 6, 2020),
https://vaughncgreene.com/tribute/details/3946/Zoey-Griffin/obituary.html.
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Though extreme in outcome, the injustice of the reflexive decision to
hold Mr. Griffin in pretrial detention was all too typical in the summer of
2020 in Baltimore City. Mr. Griffin’s hearing was one of 509 bail hearings
observed in our comprehensive June–July 2020 study of Baltimore pretrial
release adjudications. This Part tells the story of how that study unfolded,
provides a big-picture overview of its results, and recounts representative
narratives to relate the human impact of the pretrial system in a way that
numbers alone cannot.
The story begins with the not-at-all-metaphorical COVID-19 virus
wreaking havoc.33 In the pandemic’s early frightening phase, lockdowns
swept across the country.34 By early April 2020, all group-housing
situations—from nursing homes to prisons and jails—were suddenly
perceived as uniquely dangerous places.35 Advocates argued that the time
was ripe for decarceration and some authorities seemed to recognize the
sense in this argument.36 On April 14, 2020, the then-Chief Judge of the
Maryland Court of Appeals, Mary Ellen Barbera, issued a sweeping order
unmistakably encouraging measures to decrease Maryland’s pretrial and
sentenced prison population.37 Inspired by the order’s potential to enact
33. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 – 11
March 2020, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/directorgeneral/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid19---11-march-2020.
34. Archive for March 12th, 2020, OFF. OF MD. GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://governor.maryland.gov/2020/03/12/ (archiving orders from Maryland Governor Lawrence
J. Hogan at the onset of the pandemic, including prohibitions of large gatherings and the activation
of the Maryland National Guard).
35. Order of the Governor of the State of Maryland Number 20-03-30-01 Amending and
Restating the Order of March 23, 2020, Prohibiting Large Gatherings and Events and Closing
Senior Centers, and All Non-Essential Businesses and Other Establishments, and Additionally
Requiring All Persons to Stay at Home, MD. EXEC. DEP’T (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Gatherings-FOURTH-AMENDED3.30.20.pdf.
36. Calls for decarceration came from a range of perspectives, from local grassroots coalitions
to prominent policy organizations. See, e.g., Carlene Pavlos, Public Health Leaders Call for Swift
Decarceration in Face of Pandemic, MASS. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (May 5, 2020),
https://mapublichealth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Press-release-Public-Health-Leaders-callfor-Decarceration-5.5.20-final.pdf; NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., DECARCERATING
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES DURING COVID-19: ADVANCING HEALTH, EQUITY, AND SAFETY
(Emily A. Wang et al. eds., 2020), https://doi.org/10.17226/25945.
37. See Order Guiding the Response of the Trial Courts, supra note 9. In her order, Chief Judge
Barbera noted the COVID crisis and encouraged judges to: (a) “identify at-risk incarcerated persons
for potential release”; (b) “set[] prompt hearings” to resolve probation violations, failure to appear
warrants, and similar matters; (c) “consider carefully the introduction of defendants into Maryland
prisons, detention facilities, and other congregate placements”; (d) hold hearings “for detained
adults pending trial for a nonviolent criminal act or acts” or other minor matters; (e) “consider[] the
release of adult defendants from pretrial detention” weighing COVID as a factor for release; (f)
“determin[e] whether to incarcerate a new defendant on a pretrial basis” weighing COVID; and
(g)-(j) generally act with COVID in mind when it comes to sentencing, release, and modification of
sentence. Id. at 2–5 (emphasis added).
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needed reform, the authors arranged to examine pretrial release practices
during the months of June and July in Baltimore City’s primary courtroom
processing male defendants.38
At this time, bail hearings had shifted to a quasi-online mode; pretrial
detention reviews were streamed over Skype. Judges sat in their physical
courtrooms, defendants appeared on closed circuit TV (“CCTV”) from the
detention facility39 and then defense attorneys, prosecutors, and the Maryland
Division of Pretrial Detention and Services (“Pretrial Services” or “Pretrial”)
dialed into the Skype video call. The authors obtained permission40 to
“attend” the livestream daily for a two-month period. In addition, the authors
were provided with audio recordings of all hearings observed, which allowed
for rigorous verification of the recorded observations.
Here it warrants emphasis that the study was conceived with a so-called
“criminal justice system” concern.41 The planned focus was on Baltimore’s
pretrial legal system that determines whether presumptively innocent
criminal defendants are detained, released, or required to pay bail after they
are charged with crimes but before trial occurs. Baltimore’s pretrial system
serves as the front door to Maryland’s larger mass incarceration apparatus.42
Though COVID also had massively disrupted education, the economy and
many other facets of life, the authors did not presume to study COVID’s

38. This is Courtroom Four at the Baltimore City District Court on Wabash Avenue. See supra
note 27.
39. CCTV for defendants was a much-criticized pre-COVID practice that ironically seemed to
make sense during a pandemic. See generally Edie Fortuna Cimino, Zina Makar & Natalie Novak,
Charm City Televised & Dehumanized: How CCTV Bail Reviews Violate Due Process, 45 U. BALT.
L.F. 57 (2014).
40. This permission came from John Morrissey, Chief Judge of the District Court of Maryland,
and Barbara Waxman, then the Administrative Judge of Maryland’s First Judicial District
encompassing Baltimore City (documents on file with authors).
41. Contemporary activists reject the “criminal justice system” phrase, insisting that
complicated webs of bureaucratic processes meting out criminal judgment and punishment are more
accurately referred to as “criminal legal systems” since all too often they fail to supply substantive
“justice.” See, e.g., Alice Speri, The Criminal Justice System Is Not Broken. It’s Doing What It Was
Designed
to
Do.,
INTERCEPT
(Nov.
9,
2019,
10:32
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/11/09/criminal-justice-mass-incarceration-book/ (referring to Alec
Karakatsanis’ refusal to use “criminal justice system” to describe “U.S. mass punishment
bureaucracy.”); see also ALEC KARAKATSANIS, USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS
IN THE CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM (2019). Even if our prior experience had not already
confirmed the aptness of this rephrasing, the injustices seen during the course of this study would
have.
42. For an excellent data-driven snapshot of Maryland’s carceral apparatus, see Maryland
Profile, supra note 8.
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impact on domains outside our “expertise” in the pretrial system.43 The
impetus to question strict adherence to academic specialization came later.44
On May 25, 2020, six days before Courtroom Four observations were
to begin, George Floyd was murdered by police officer Derek Chauvin.45 Mr.
Floyd’s killing was captured in a viral video that made visceral the ongoing
brutality of American racism.46 Despite the pandemic, masses filled the
streets demanding racial justice.47 Many who had never spoken up before
joined an intense national conversation—a true “racial reckoning” seemed
imminent.48 By June 1, protests were morphing into widespread calls for
awareness and change.49 Institutions across America, including law schools
and court systems, issued statements calling for an end to structural racism.50
43. Though of different generations, both authors are law professors who have run clinics
engaging in pretrial criminal defense in Baltimore City. One of the authors, Doug Colbert, has
worked in Maryland since 1994 and has actively participated in reform efforts and conversations
since then. See, e.g., Colbert, Illusory Right to Counsel, supra note 7; Douglas L. Colbert, Ray
Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002) [hereinafter Colbert et al., Do Attorneys
Really Matter?]; Douglas L. Colbert, “With a Little Help from My Friends:” Counsel at Bail and
Enhanced Pretrial Justice Becomes the New Reality, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 795 (2020); Douglas
L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333 (2011); Colbert, Convicting
the Unrepresented, supra note 7; Colbert, Justice Before the Trial, supra note 7. The other author,
Colin Starger, has labored in the pretrial space since the Baltimore uprising sparked by the killing
of Freddie Gray in 2015. See, e.g., Colin Starger, The Argument that Cries Wolfish, 1 MIT
COMPUTATIONAL
L.
REP.
(Aug.
17,
2020,
10:48
AM),
https://law.mit.edu/pub/theargumentcrieswolfish/release/2; Colin Starger & Michael Bullock,
Legitimacy, Authority, and the Right to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 589 (2018).
While we undeniably have perspectives shaped by relevant real-world experience, we nonetheless
put “expertise” in scare quotes to emphasize the perils of overly specialized and siloed forms of
knowledge production.
44. See infra note 203.
45. See Alex Altman, Why the Killing of George Floyd Sparked an American Uprising, TIME
(June 4, 2020, 6:49 AM), https://time.com/5847967/george-floyd-protests-trump/.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.; Dana R. Fisher, The Diversity of the Recent Black Lives Matter Protests is a Good
Sign for Racial Equity, BROOKINGS INST. (July 8, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-werise/2020/07/08/the-diversity-of-the-recent-black-lives-matter-protests-is-a-good-sign-for-racialequity/ (“As sociologist Doug McAdam remarks while looking back over his career studying social
movements, ‘We have never seen protests like these before, in turnout, perseverance, and the ethnic
and racial diversity of those participating.’”).
49. See Altman, supra note 45.
50. See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin et al., Maryland Carey Law Statement on the Killing of Black
and Brown People, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. OF L.,
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/News-and-Events/Maryland-Carey-Law-News/Maryland-CareyLaw-Statement-on-the-Killing-of-Black-and-Brown-People.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2022); USM
Institutions Stand in Solidarity Against Structural Racism and Resulting Violence Against Minority
Communities, UNIV. OF BALT. (June 1, 2020), https://www.ubalt.edu/news/newsreleases.cfm?id=3527; Gillian Lester, Staying Anchored to Our Purpose as We End the Year,
COLUM. L. SCH. (June 5, 2020), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/staying-anchoredour-purpose-we-end-year; Mary Ellen Barbera, Statement on Equal Justice under Law, MD.
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Adding explicit demands to confront institutional racism to the ongoing
COVID crisis should have increased the pressure to decarcerate the Blackoverrepresented pretrial system in Baltimore. The question seemed called;
material conditions were ripe for incremental reform.
A. Legal Framework and Procedure; Study Results
Before reporting on study findings, a brief review of Maryland’s pretrial
release framework and procedures is in order.
On paper, legal procedures governing judicial pretrial release decisions
favor the accused’s right to regain liberty after first appearing in court. Like
most states, Maryland’s statutes entitle most criminal defendants to release
either on personal recognizance (“ROR”)51 or under the least onerous
conditions.52 Conditions of release more onerous than ROR but less onerous
than outright detention include Unsecured Personal Bond (“UPB”), release
on Home Detention (“ROR-HDTN”) and release on cash bail (“MONEY”).53
Two exceptions to the presumed rule of release apply: “[U]pon a finding by
the judicial officer that, if the defendant is released . . . the defendant (i) will
not appear when required, or (ii) will be a danger to an alleged victim, another
person, or the community.”54 When one of these exceptions is triggered, the
defendant is detained—aka Held Without Bond (“HWOB”).
The burden of proof to justify detention on the grounds of
dangerousness is high: It must be “clear and convincing.”55 To justify HWOB
based on the risk of non-appearance, the burden of proof in Maryland is less

JUDICIARY
(June
9,
2020),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/coappeals/pdfs/statementonequaljustice060920.pdf.
51. Release on personal recognizance, also known as release on own recognizance (“ROR”),
refers to a defendant’s release from pretrial custody usually without any conditions, although ROR
may be conditioned on pretrial supervision. Essentially, the defendant promises to appear at the next
court date and future court proceedings. See MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(6) (defining release on personal
recognizance).
52. Maryland Rule 4-216.1 is the state’s main pretrial release rule. The rule’s explicit purpose
is “to promote the release of defendants on their own recognizance or, when necessary, unsecured
bond.” MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1)(A); see also Bradds v. Randolph, 239 Md. App. 50, 79, 194 A.3d 444,
461 (2018) (noting that Rule 4-216.1 “specifically prioritizes release over detention, release on own
recognizance over release with conditions, and non-financial conditions over financial conditions”).
53. Cash bail (“MONEY”) involves the deposit of a surety bond, which is returned when the
defendant appears at court. Although cash bails used to be common in Maryland, they were subject
to intense criticism due to the disproportionate impact on poor people and the unscrupulous practices
of bail bondsmen. See generally Starger & Bullock, supra note 43. Unsecured Personal Bond works
like cash bail but without the defendant paying a deposit. Instead, the defendant promises to pay
money if he or she fails to appear. Finally, home detention is self-explanatory and results in home
confinement, often with GPS ankle monitors.
54. MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1)(B).
55. See Wheeler v. State, 160 Md. App. 566, 579, 864 A.2d 1058, 1065 (2005) (stating that the
“clear and convincing evidence” standard regarding the danger of a defendant is a strong procedural
protection for the defendant’s liberty interest).
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clear.56 Regardless of this ambiguity, judicial orders remanding the defendant
to jail until the case resolves by plea or trial are supposed to be rare. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist reminded judges more than thirty years ago in United
States v. Salerno,57 pretrial “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”58
This Article’s study observed district court bail review hearings in
Baltimore City. District court bail reviews are the second step in Maryland’s
unusual two-stage pretrial release procedure. The first judicial step after the
arrest and booking of defendants involves an appearance before a district
court commissioner conducted inside the jail.59 The commissioner, who need
not be a lawyer, has limited discretion whether to release or incarcerate the
individual on serious felony charges.60 Defendants not released at the
commissioner stage remain in jail until the next weekday, when they appear
before an actual district court judge for bail review.61 For shorthand, this
Article uses “BALR” to refer to bail review hearings.62
District court judges have more discretion than commissioners to make
release decisions for all crimes. Maryland’s statutory rules provide a host of
factors for a judge’s consideration in deciding whether an accused is entitled
to release and can be trusted to reappear in court.63 While judges differ in the
56. See MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1)(B). The inconsistent standard for detention on the grounds of
dangerousness versus risk of non-appearance is an oddity. See Brian Saccenti, Pretrial Release &
Detention in Maryland After the 2017 Amendments to the Pretrial Release Rules, 17 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 307, 315 (2017) (“At present, no Maryland case, statute, or
rule establishes the standard of proof applicable when the State seeks to detain someone based on
risk of non-appearance.”).
57. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
58. Id. at 755.
59. See MD. R. 4-213. Unfortunately, commissioner hearings in Baltimore City are closed to
the public and take place inside a jail cell where a defense lawyer interviews the accused, while a
commissioner sits on the other side of a plexiglass divide. Unsuccessful litigation challenging this
practice notwithstanding, bail review hearings still take place inside the bowels of the jail and outof-sight of the public and family of the accused.
60. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-202 (2022).
61. District courts do not conduct bail reviews on weekends. Consequently, a person arrested
on Thursday appears before a commissioner the following day. If not released on that Friday by the
commissioner, the person then waits three more days in jail for a reviewing judge to appear on
Monday.
62. The BALR acronym is used by Maryland Judiciary Case Search, Maryland’s online court
records
portal.
Event
Codes
Criminal,
MD.
JUDICIARY,
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/casesearch2/pdfs/criminaleventcodes.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2022).
63. See MD. R. 4-216.1(f) (listing the factors that a judicial officer should consider in
determining whether a defendant should be released and the conditions of the release, including,
among other factors, “the defendant’s prior record of appearance at court proceedings or flight to
avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings; . . . the defendant’s family ties,
employment status and history, financial resources, reputation, character and mental condition,
length of residence in the community, and length of residence in this State; . . . [and] any other factor
bearing on the risk of a willful failure to appear . . . including all prior convictions”).
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various weight they assign to given factors, they generally agree with the
importance of the following: the nature of the charge, the defendant’s record
of prior convictions and failure(s) to appear in court, the defendant’s danger
to others if released, and the defendant’s ties to the community.64
In Baltimore City, bail review hearings unfold in a standard order. After
calling the case, the judge listens to the presentation of Pretrial Services.65
The pretrial agent makes a recommendation (ROR, HWOB, MONEY, etc.)
based on an evaluation of the defendant’s prior arrest, conviction, and
appearance history, as well as on other information including employment
and family ties.66 Then the prosecutor argues for a pretrial outcome, often
focusing upon the gravity of the crime, any injuries sustained by the crime
victim, and the defendant’s prior criminal history. Finally, defense counsel’s
advocacy usually stresses the defendant’s employment, family, residence,
and community ties to support the likelihood of re-appearing and not reoffending. The whole process is over quickly. A single bail hearing involving
Pretrial Services, a prosecuting and defense lawyer, and the district court
judge is typically completed in seven to eight minutes. Most judges take less
than a minute when ordering detainees to remain in jail (HWOB) indefinitely.
Figure 2
Observed BALR Hearings

As shown in Figure 2 above, the faculty/law student team observed
forty-four days of hearings in June and July (twenty-two days each in June
64. MD. R. 4-216(e)(1).
65. Pretrial Services assesses criminal history, provides community supervision to defendants
released on recognizance awaiting trial, and also engages in risk classification for bail review. See
Maryland Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR.
SERVS., https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/agencies/dpds.shtml (last visited Aug. 29, 2022); see also
George Joseph, Justice by Algorithm, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-08/is-baltimore-s-risk-assessment-toolworking (describing Pretrial Services and critiquing use of risk assessment instrument).
66. The judge may condition release on Pretrial Services supervising and monitoring the
defendant while charges remain pending.
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and July).67 In total, 509 hearings of individual BALR defendants were
recorded and coded.68 On average, judges heard nearly twelve bail review
hearings a day.69 Mondays usually saw increased numbers since judges’ bail
review hearings are not held on weekends.
Figure 3
All Defendant Outcomes (n=509)70
Outcome
Held Without Bail (HWOB)
Unsecured Personal Bond (UPB)
Release on Own Recognizance (ROR)
Cash Bond (MONEY)
Home Detention (ROR-HDTN)

Number
313
85
71
26
14

Percent
61.5%
16.7%
13.9%
5.1%
2.8%

Figure 3 shows the pretrial outcomes for all defendants. The numbers
are gravely disappointing. An overall 61.5% detention rate translated to more
people behind bars—a result very much at odds with Chief Judge Barbera’s

67. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 29, for the data and code used to produce Figure 2.
We observed hearings on every weekday except July 3, which was a court holiday.
68. Note that Courtroom Four heard matters that had to do with more than 509 defendants
during this period. Though bail reviews constitute the primary business, other matters including the
issuance of warrants and re-listing of cases also occur. Data collection for this study was limited to
bona fide bail review cases decided on the day. Delayed bail reviews—where relisting occurred
multiple times—were recorded just once, on the day the review was finally conducted.
69. The precise average was 11.57 hearings per day with a median of 10. See Jupyter Notebook,
supra note 5, ¶ 30.
70. For code and data used to create Figure 3, see id. ¶¶ 31–32.
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April 2020 directive issued in response to the COVID pandemic.71 Instead of
pretrial detention being a “carefully limited exception,”72 it had remained the
default rule even during a dangerous global pandemic. Unfortunately, district
court judges received encouragement to reach HWOB decisions by the other
state actors in the courtroom—the prosecution and Pretrial Services.
Surprisingly, when the prosecution made recommendations, it argued for
detention 94% of the time.73 Pretrial Services, meanwhile, recommended
HWOB 75% of the time.74 In the relatively few cases when the prosecution
or Pretrial Services recommended ROR or UPB, judges usually rejected their
recommendation.75
As grim as these numbers were, the picture only worsened when
accounting for race. As shown in Figure 4 below, Black defendants were
detained 62.6% of the time while the detention rate for white defendants was
55.6%. This discrepancy points towards structural racism affecting bail
outcomes. Note that the third catch-all racial category (unknown and other)
had a detention rate of 56.5% that was much closer to the white rate than the
Black rate. These particular outcomes are more consistent with institutional
anti-Blackness than with the pretrial system conferring white privilege.76

71. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing April 14, 2020, directive). Here it is
worth noting that Baltimore’s pretrial jailed population did initially drop at the beginning of the
pandemic, primarily because of reduced arrests. See infra Figure 5 and accompanying text.
However, the high detention rate set the condition for the subsequent rebound of the pretrial
incarcerated population when arrests resumed to “normal” levels. See infra Figure 6.
72. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
73. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 33. The prosecution made recommendations in 480
out of 509 cases: 451 HWOB (94%), 28 ROR (6%), and a single MONEY (<1%). Id.
74. See id. ¶ 34. Pretrial Services made recommendations in 500 out of 509 cases: 377 HWOB,
107 ROR (21%), 10 UPB (2%), and 6 MONEY (1%). Id.
75. See id. ¶ 35. With respect to Pretrial Services, judges only followed ROR recommendations
43% of the time (46 out of 107), UPB 40% (4 out of 10) and money bail 50% (3 out of 6). Id. By
contrast, judges followed Pretrial Services’ HWOB recommendation 79% of the time (299 out of
377). Id. With respect to the prosecution, judges followed the prosecution’s ROR recommendation
just 29% of the time (8 out of 28) and MONEY bail in the one case when a prosecutor suggested a
money bond. Id. ¶ 36. Once again, judges were most likely to follow a prosecutor’s HWOB
recommendation and did so in 62% of the cases (281 out of 451 times). Id.
76. Cf. Michele Goodwin, Law and Anti-Blackness, 26 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (2021).
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Figure 4
Bail Outcomes by Race77

Once again, it bears emphasis that this study occurred during a national
conversation around structural racism that featured high-profile
commitments to confronting inequality. Indeed, on June 9, 2020, then-Chief
Judge Barbera issued a “Statement on Equal Justice under Law” on behalf of
the Maryland courts.78 This statement contained strong rhetoric—“[t]he
protests of the last several weeks have coalesced into a truth that cannot be
ignored: people of color are being denied their rightful equality”— and
signaled a change in consciousness—“[t]his recognition of the need for
collective resolve is not new, but perhaps our determination to address the
long-term inequities spawned by slavery and Jim Crow, has, at last, become

77. For the code and data used to create Figure 4, see Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 38.
78. See Barbera, supra note 50.
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new.”79 The statement even highlighted pretrial reform as one “systemic
inequit[y] that affect[s] the poor and people of color more often and with
greater detriment” and pledged to work “to eliminate the pretrial detention of
those who do not pose a risk, but cannot afford even a low monetary bail.”80
Despite these soaring words, little changed.
B. Representative Narratives
Some critics might defend this lack of change and disproportionately
high 61.5% Black pretrial detention rate as merely reflective of a notoriously
violent city that also happens to be majority Black. Such perspective would
be wrong on multiple levels. First, Baltimore’s status as a majority Black city
does not absolve it of the obligation to seek equity in the criminal legal
system. Second, pretrial defendants are presumed innocent no matter how
serious the charges—and more often than not in district court, this
presumption of innocence is effectively vindicated when all charges against
a defendant are unceremoniously dropped.81 And third, even if all the charges
levied against the defendants had merit, the fact is that only a minority of
defendants in the study stood accused of crimes of violence.82
Putting empirical data to the side, the judgment that the 61.5% detention
rate was not warranted stems from the experience of listening to 509 bail
reviews and hearing similar tales repeated once and again. Although several
hearings observed involved defendants charged with violent felonies where
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 2.
81. In Maryland, dropping of charges is referred to by the Latin phrase Nolle Prosequi—
colloquially “nolle pross.” According to a comprehensive study conducted by one of this Article’s
authors, the four largest district court systems in Maryland (Baltimore City, Baltimore County,
Montgomery County, and Prince George’s County) had a total nolle pross rate of 61% from 2013–
2017. See Starger, supra note 43. This means that in more than half of the cases charged in district
court, all the charges against the defendant will be dropped. Though ultimate outcomes were not
tracked for all cases in this Article’s study, a similarly high nolle pross rate was observed in cases
resolved within a year of the study’s completion.
82. Maryland criminal law explicitly defines “crimes of violence” for the purposes of
mandatory sentencing. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101(a) (2022). Using this statutory
definition, only 28.9% of study defendants (147 of 509) faced a violent charge. See Jupyter
Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 54. The most common violent charges were first degree assault, robbery,
attempted first degree murder, and first degree murder. While 71.1% (362 of 509) of defendants did
not face a crime of violence charge, it should be noted that the close to half of these defendants
(171) faced a second degree assault charge. Id. ¶ 55. The most common charge in Maryland, second
degree assault, was also the most common top charge in our study (33.6%). Id. ¶ 56. The peculiar
difficulties presented by this crime are discussed infra at notes 88–92 and accompanying text. In
sum, 37.5% of study defendants (191 of 509) faced a non-violent top charge other than second
degree assault. Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 56–58. The most common of these non-violent
charges were CDS (drugs) possession, firearm possession, and violation of an ex parte order. Id.
¶ 59. The HWOB rates for violent and non-violent top charged defendants were 77.6% and 55%,
respectively. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. The second degree assault HWOB rate was 40.9%. Id. ¶ 64. The HWOB
rate for non-violent crimes excluding second degree assault was 67.5%. Id. ¶ 65.
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detention was justified based on the record presented to the court, those cases
truly were the exception rather than the rule.83 More typically, “charged with
a violent felony” was a headline obscuring a more complicated narrative. The
following narratives are representative of cases observed.
On June 10, Alvis Tellman, a 31-year-old Black man from western
Baltimore, appeared before Judge Diana Smith.84 Mr. Tellman stood accused
of resisting arrest and second degree assault. Pretrial Services explained that
Mr. Tellman had no history of violence among his five non-violent
convictions, the most recent for trespass (2019) and disorderly conduct
(2018).85 Per the prosecution’s account, Mr. Tellman had disobeyed a police
officer who had placed his hands on Mr. Tellman’s wife. According to the
defense, Mr. Tellman suffered from mental health issues and became upset
when the officer touched his wife. The officer approached the defendant after
his wife had grabbed him around the neck. (She was also charged with
assault.) When the officer made contact, the defendant yelled “don’t touch
her” and attempted to kick, headbutt, and bite the officer, who sustained a
possible concussion and broken nose.
Though the allegations of assault were somewhat serious, initial police
contact with Mr. Tellman’s wife and his own mental health struggles clearly
complicated the situation. Yet this context counted for little at bail review.
Judge Smith ordered Mr. Tellman detained without bail where he remained
83. The authors accepted as justified HWOB rulings in violent felony cases where the
prosecutor presented plausible evidence of guilt or recent serious criminal history combined with
recent failures to appear. For example, on June 17, 2020, Judge Flynn M. Owens held Mr. Thomas
Junes (a pseudonym) without bail when he was charged with murder in the first degree. Mr. Junes
allegedly shot and killed a WEAA radio announcer, an incident which had eyewitnesses and video
surveillance footage. See id. ¶¶ 66–68 (defendant number 141; case number 3B02422927); see also
Phil Davis, WEAA Announcer Shot and Killed Outside Baltimore Home While Trying to Stop
Dispute Between Neighbors, Documents Show, BALT. SUN (June 17, 2020, 4:34 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-cr-richard-green-arrest-20200617rn4fjuy3angutf6w764vgu3tui-story.html. Additionally, on June 19, 2020, Judge Smith held Mr.
Travell Pelliam (a pseudonym) without bail when he was charged with armed robbery and five
additional robbery and assault and theft charges. His most recent failure to appear (“FTA”) occurred
only months prior and he had five pending matters. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 69–71
(defendant number 168; case number 4B02416782). Finally, we agreed with Judge Mark F. Scurti’s
decision on July 20, 2020, when he held Mr. Nigel Ingaglia (a pseudonym) without bail when he
was charged with burglary in the first degree, first degree assault, motor vehicle unlawful taking,
and thirteen other charges including gun charges. Mr. Ingaglia also had fifteen prior convictions and
two prior FTAs. See id. ¶¶ 72–74 (defendant number 413; case numbers 0B02420719, 6B02419626,
5B02398989, 3B02396495, 1B02420125, 2B02422828, and 1B02423590).
84. Audiotape: Bail Review Hearing, held by the District Court for Baltimore City, Judge Diana
A.E. Smith (June 10, 2020) (on file with author) [hereinafter Judge Smith Audiotape] (supporting
entire narrative that follows). Alvis Tellman is a pseudonym. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note
5, ¶¶ 75–77 (defendant number 85; case number 0B02419018). Based on his home address, Mr.
Tellman was from the “Howard Park/West Arlington” neighborhood. Id. ¶ 76. This neighborhood
is 89% Black and ranks 21 out of 55 in median household income ($53,534 in 2019). Id. ¶¶ 78–79.
85. Despite this relatively mild criminal record, Pretrial Services and the prosecution
recommended HWOB in Mr. Tellman’s case. Id. ¶ 76.
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for nearly eighteen months waiting for trial. Ultimately, Mr. Tellman pled
guilty on December 7, 2021.86
With no history of violence and only minor misdemeanor convictions,
and with no mention of a concern that Mr. Tellman would fail to appear in
court, Mr. Tellman’s long months of pretrial incarceration were unduly harsh
and undoubtedly created pressure for him to take an eventual plea.87 Based
on the information provided, he never presented the kind of extreme danger
to the community that should be required to overcome the norm of pretrial
liberty.
Not only does Mr. Tellman’s story typify the factual complexity and
ordinary human drama of many cases requiring pretrial resolution in District
Court, but it also stands as an example of the most common charge seen in
Maryland and in the study—second degree misdemeanor assault. Of the
cases heard in the study, 34% had “Assault 2” as a top charge.88 Without
doubt, this crime created problems for judges at bail review; the crime is a
peculiar type of misdemeanor that technically can carry from no jail time all
the way up to a ten-year sentence.89 The scope of behavior that can be
categorized under the capacious misdemeanor assault category is thus
ridiculously vast.90 A trivial shove could count as misdemeanor assault, but
so too could a vicious domestic violence attack resulting in broken bones,
stitches, and hospitalization. Yet on paper, both incidents would appear as
assault in the second degree. Though misdemeanor assault allegations have
the potential to involve alarming violence, most truly serious assaults will be
charged as assault in the first degree, a felony.91 Based on our observations
during this study and over the years, it is common for misdemeanor assault
to involve no tangible injury at all nor require any medical treatment. Too
often, judges in our study appeared to reflexively detain defendants based on

86. After Mr. Tellman requested a jury trial, the district court transferred the case to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City on October 20, 2020—case number 820294002. According to Maryland
Judiciary Case Search his guilty plea was retroactive to April 20, 2021. MD. JUDICIARY, Maryland
Judiciary Case Search Criteria, https://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/ (last visited Nov.
10, 2022) [hereinafter Case Search].
87. This is not to say that his guilty plea was warranted or unwarranted on the facts. Rather, the
point is that eighteen months of pretrial incarceration is a highly coercive factor in the context of
his decision to plead guilty.
88. See supra note 82 (showing that 171 of 509 defendants had second degree assault as their
highest charge).
89. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-203 (2022).
90. Id.
91. First degree assault requires either the use of a firearm or the intent to “cause serious
physical injury.” Id. § 3-202(b)(1). However, “serious physical injury” is in turn required to create
a substantial risk of death or cause serious and permanent disfigurement or loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ. MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, MARYLAND CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4:01.1A (2d ed. 2018).
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thin misdemeanor assault allegations.92 Less-than-convincing evidence was
used in particular to justify pretrial detention in criminal possession of
weapons cases.
On July 9, 2020, Judge Joyce Baylor-Thompson heard the misdemeanor
gun possession case of Kevin Scutt a 20-year-old Black man from Baltimore
County.93 Mr. Scutt had been the passenger in a car searched by the police,
which recovered a loaded gun in the purse of a female passenger, now Mr.
Scutt’s co-defendant. Mr. Scutt himself faced the identical series of gunpossession charges. This was Mr. Scutt’s first and only arrest, but Pretrial
again recommended “no bail” despite considering him low risk. Judge
Baylor-Thompson agreed and ordered HWOB. Mr. Scutt then spent twelve
days in jail before he was released ROR with home detention (ROR-HDTN)
at a bail re-review.94 Several months later, on September 11, Mr. Scutt pled
guilty to a loaded handgun in vehicle charge and received a one-year
probation sentence.95
Less than two weeks after Mr. Scutt’s initial bail review, on July 21,
Judge Baylor-Thompson heard the case of another young Black man, 22year-old Andre Eppurson.96 Mr. Eppurson was charged with possessing an
unloaded rifle found in the trunk of the car he was driving but did not own.97
Self-employed and with no prior Maryland convictions (he was on probation
for misdemeanor assault in Oregon), Mr. Eppurson was hardly anybody’s
idea of a violent felon who required preventative detention to keep the public
safe. Judge Baylor-Thompson, a thoughtful judge with one of the lowest
92. Without question the difficulty in adjudicating second degree assault cases is further
complicated by its connection to intimate partner violence (“IPV”). Many IPV cases are charged as
misdemeanor assaults. Though judges might laudably wish to confront this entrenched and
persistent problem, research suggests that incarceration tends to make the problem worse, not better.
See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY
APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2018).
93. Audiotape: Bail Review Hearing, held by the District Court for Baltimore City, Judge Joyce
M. Baylor-Thompson (July 9, 2020) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Judge Baylor-Thompson
Audiotape] (supporting entire narrative that follows); see Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 80–
81. Kevin Scutt is a pseudonym. Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 80–81 (defendant number 328;
case number 4B02420541). Mr. Scutt did not have a Baltimore City address, but rather was from
Towson, a small city, and the county seat of Baltimore County. His charges included: handgun on
person, loaded handgun on person, handgun in a vehicle, loaded handgun in a vehicle, handgun
within 100 yards of a park, and handgun in vehicle within 100 yards of a park. See id. ¶ 81.
94. This was likely done “on paper” since Mr. Scutt did not appear in person on the date
indicated on Maryland Judiciary Case Search for ROR release. Case Search, supra note 86.
95. Confirmed on Maryland Judiciary Case Search. Id.
96. Judge Baylor-Thompson Audiotape, supra note 93; see Jupyter Notebook, supra note
5, ¶¶ 82–83. Andre Eppurson is a pseudonym. Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 82–83 (defendant
number 433; case number 1B02420286). Based on his home address, Mr. Eppurson hailed from
Lauraville, in the northeastern part of Baltimore. Id. ¶ 82. This is a more middle-class neighborhood
with a median household income of approximately $75,000. Id. ¶¶ 84–85.
97. He was also charged with illegal possession of ammunition. See Jupyter Notebook, supra
note 5, ¶ 83.
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judicial detention rates in the study,98 set the stage by describing herself as a
“stickler when it comes to guns.” Judge Baylor-Thompson then ordered
detention, announcing “just the idea of having a rifle in the trunk of a car is
enough to hold you without bail.” With these words, Judge Baylor-Thompson
virtually acknowledged a bias for jailing anyone charged with gun
possession, even when proving possession might be challenging. And proving
possession was always going to be challenging in Mr. Eppurson’s case, as
indicated by the prosecution dropping all the charges against Mr. Eppurson
on September 2. All the time he spent in jail based on the mere accusation of
gun possession—forty-three days—was unnecessary and unjustified.99 Mr.
Eppurson will never get that time back.
The experiences of Mr. Scutt and Mr. Eppurson are unfortunately
common. Baltimore bail judges worry about guns and often order HWOB
whenever the word “gun” is mentioned. At first blush, this impulse is
understandable. Gun violence plagues Baltimore and the city suffers from a
painfully high murder rate.100 Yet reflexive detention for defendants accused
of mere gun possession makes little sense upon closer examination. All “gun
crimes” are not equal; there is a world of difference between using a gun
while committing a crime and keeping a gun for self-defense. Indeed, the fact
is that Baltimore’s very dangerousness often means that individuals living in
hyper-segregated neighborhoods carry guns for self-defense and
protection.101 Overlooking this reality reflects judicial privilege and the
judges’ distance from the day-to-day reality of certain parts of Baltimore.
When judges see the gun but not the person, they reproduce systemic
dehumanization.
Callous disregard and total rejection of Pretrial supervision for released
detainees is also seen in the final narrative in this Part.

98. Judge Baylor-Thompson’s detention rate of 46.5% was the second-lowest among the 16
Baltimore City District Court judges. Id. ¶ 87. Judge Scurti had the lowest detention rate—46.4%.
Id. The average detention rate for judges who presided at bail hearings of presumptively innocent
defendants was 66%, and the median was 64.5%. Id. In short, for judges as a whole, the
“presumption of innocence” did not translate to better than even a 40% release rate. Id.
99. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 88 (calculating days held in jail).
100. See generally Justin Fenton & Carl Johnson, Baltimore Homicides, BALT. SUN,
https://homicides.news.baltimoresun.com/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); N.Y. DIV. OF CRIM. JUST.
SERVS., CRIME IN NEW YORK STATE 2019 FINAL DATA 8 app. 4 (2020),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/Crime-in-NYS-2019.pdf. In 2019, for example,
the number of homicides Baltimore City was 348, a total which exceeded the total amount of
murders in all of New York City. Fenton & Johnson, supra; N.Y. DIV. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., supra,
at 6 app. 2 (showing that there were 319 homicides in New York City in 2019).
101. Cf. Brief of the Black Attorneys of Legal Aid, The Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defender
Services, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20–25, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n,
Inc. v. Corlett, 141 S. Ct. 2566 (2021) (No. 20-843) (recounting stories of The Bronx Defenders’
clients who carried weapons for self-defense).
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Judge William Dunn had the distinction of being the judge with the
highest pretrial incarceration rate of detainees who appeared before him.102
Like every Baltimore City bail review judge, Judge Dunn first hears from
Pretrial when considering whether to release a defendant. Pretrial conducts
a variety of tasks that judges find important, including review of a
defendant’s criminal history, verifying employment, and contacting family.
Critically, Pretrial can also supervise defendants who are released on
recognizance or on unsecured personal bond by requiring phone calls and/or
in-person check-ins at their offices. Although Baltimore’s Pretrial has an
impressive record of helping defendants appear in court,103 Judge Dunn
effectively eliminated ROR with pretrial supervision as a viable release
option before ever listening to the facts of any case. Across four different
June–July bail review sessions,104 Judge Dunn engaged in the following stock
dialogue with a Pretrial representative at the start of that day’s bail review
docket:
Judge Dunn: [T]he last time I sent the bail review docket was last
week, and as a result of my voir dire of the pretrial investigator on
that date I discovered that the Baltimore City Division of Pretrial
Detention and Services is not capable of adequately ensuring the
safety of the community, or assuring the appearance of the
defendant at trial in the event I want to consider conditions or
accommodations of conditions of release when imposing the least
onerous conditions. In other words, the last time I voir dire’d your
office, I discovered that your agency is incapable of monitoring
released defendants with GPS and/or ankle bracelets, that your
organization has no additional sources of electronic monitoring,
that you’re not able to adequately monitor defendant’s movements
or enforce residency restrictions, and that you’re not able to
adequately enforce no-contact orders or enforce work
requirements. Has anything changed either with your Division’s
staffing and/or funding which has changed your ability to more
102. Audiotape: Bail Review Hearing, held by the District Court for Baltimore City, Judge
William Dunn (July 16, 2020) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Judge Dunn Audiotape]
(supporting entire narrative that follows). While Judge Kerry technically had a 100% HWOB rate,
this statistic was based on a single hearing for just one defendant. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note
5, ¶¶ 86–87. In contrast, among the forty-one defendants whose bail reviews he conducted, Judge
Dunn never released a single person on recognizance, unsecured bond or home detention. The judge
ordered money bail for eight detainees. Id. ¶¶ 89–90.
103. According to Robert Weisengoff, Executive Director of the Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services’ Pretrial Release Program, the average Failure to Appear (“FTA”) rate
for those under pretrial supervision from 2014–2021 was 5.18%. See E-mail from Robert
Weisengoff, Exec. Dir., Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. Pretrial Release Program, to
authors, (Sept. 19, 2022, 11:06 AM EST) (on file with authors). In 2020–2021, the average FTA
rate for those under pretrial supervision was very low—2.46%. Id.
104. Judge Dunn conducted bail reviews on June 2, June 11, July 16, and July 31. See Jupyter
Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 91–93.
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effectively monitor defendant’s pre-trial in the event I want to
consider releasing a defendant as the least restrictive alternative to
incarceration?
Pretrial Investigator: No, it hasn’t Your Honor.
Judge Dunn: Alright, thank you.105
Following an exchange like this on four separate days, Judge Dunn
failed to release a single one of forty-one defendants on recognizance, with
or without pretrial supervision.106 Instead, he ordered detention without bail
for thirty-three individuals (80%) and then cash money bond for the
remaining eight (20%). The judge never selected an unsecured personal bond
or regular home detention for any person appearing before him.
Judge Dunn’s never-changing colloquy with Pretrial regarding their
supposed inability to protect the community without GPS monitoring
assumed the aspect of absurdist theatre as he repeated it day after day. His
implicit argument failed to justify the harshness meted out, as the law does
not require GPS monitoring as a condition of ROR and the remarkable
success record of Pretrial in their ordinary-course non-GPS supervision is a
matter of public record.107 Indeed, other judges routinely employ Pretrial
Services to supervise ROR’d defendants with success. Yet Judge Dunn
persisted with the same script, keeping the machine humming, sending
presumed innocent defendants to jail with little discernable attention to
individual circumstances.
The stories related above from Courtroom Four when presided over by
Judges Chen, Smith, Baylor-Thompson, and Dunn, could just as easily be
replaced with stories from most of the other twelve judges who sat in June
and July of 2020. As it happens, Judges Dunn and Smith had the highest
HWOB detention rates of judges observed (80% and 79% respectively with
Judge Chen not far behind at 74%), but Judge Baylor-Thompson had the
second-to-lowest (46%).108 In this way, their decisions represent the system’s
spectrum, which favored detention across the board. In the end, no matter
105. Judge Dunn Audiotape, supra note 102, at 3:56–5:03.
106. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 89–90.
107. See E-mail from Robert Weisengoff, supra note 103 (confirming that the FTA rate of
Pretrial-supervised defendants has steadily decreased since 2016, falling from 6.97% in 2016, to
4.83% in 2019); MD. DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., DIVISION OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
AND SERVICES REPORT 4 (Nov. 2016) (finding that of the 710 defendants under Pretrial’s
supervision at the end of September 2016, 53 failed to appear in court or were re-arrested); MD.
DEPT. OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., DIVISION OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND SERVICES
REPORT 4 (May 2017) (finding that of the 966 defendants under Pretrial’s supervision at the end of
March 2017, 67 failed to appear in court or were re-arrested).
108. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 95; supra note 98.
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how the data is sliced, or stories are told, the bottom line was that
decarceration and a turning-away-from-detention did not occur despite the
crises and promises of summer 2020.
II. FAILED REFORM AND THE BLACK BUTTERFLY
What happened? How had meaningful change failed to transpire in
Baltimore when material conditions—the public health emergency and
explicit racial reckoning—seemed so uniquely aligned to facilitate carceral
reform? At one level, it is clear that despite operating under far-from-normal
circumstances, pretrial actors had lacked the courage to disrupt “business as
usual.” When it came down to it, Baltimore’s bail judges lacked the collective
nerve to break the momentum of a pretrial machine primed to relentlessly
incarcerate Black bodies.
At the same time, judges do not control the racial makeup of defendants
brought into their courts by the police. Judges did not make the arrests that
resulted in 83% of pretrial defendants being Black in a 57% Black city. Yet,
the disparity observed in bail outcomes (a 63% HWOB rate for Black
defendants versus a 55% HWOB rate for white defendants) compounded the
far more extreme disparity found in the initial defendant population (83%
Black versus 12% white). The reality of twin disparities points to a larger
conundrum. Pretrial actors did not create the observed structural inequality,
but neither did they confront it. How does one apportion fault among cogs in
a machine that seemingly runs on inertia and customary practices?
This Part takes a first pass at unraveling this conundrum by placing the
dashed promise of 2020 into the context of the Maryland pretrial domain’s
long history of setbacks and frustrated reform. The repeating pattern of
unsuccessful reform points out the limits of a reform model predicated on a
virus metaphor of structural racism described in the Introduction.109 This Part
then turns to the Black butterfly and shows how it reveals the deeper DNA
of structural racism in Baltimore. The work of Dr. Brown on the Black
butterfly is explained in further detail and the graphical methodology of the
remainder of the Article is introduced.110
A. The Perennial Struggle of Maryland Pretrial Reform
While pretrial defendants are theoretically protected by the presumption
of innocence, critics have noted that this presumption is most often honored
in its breach.111 Across the nation and in Maryland, pretrial incarcerated
109. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.
110. See generally supra note 22.
111. See Starger, supra note 43, at 2 (“The true affront to our cherished POI [presumption of
innocence] tradition is the phenomenon of mass pretrial incarceration.”); Shima Baradaran,
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 725 (2011) (“The practical results
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populations have soared over the past decades despite this presumption.112
This spike in pretrial incarcerated population is due to a combination of
defendants being given unaffordable money bails (that they cannot post and
therefore remain in jail) and being subjected to outright pretrial detention.113
During the past two decades, there has been a flurry of reform activity in
Maryland attempting to address the unaffordable bail problem.114 These
reform efforts followed from earlier reforms.115 A brief review of that history
illustrates how reform efforts inevitably encountered push-back and how
apparent victories quickly become undermined.116
For decades, the most visible opponent of pretrial reform in Maryland
was the bail bond and insurance industry.117 The lucrative bail bond business
thrived on collecting ten percent non-refundable fees from defendants’
families and friends in exchange for underwriting each individual bond that
freed a loved one from jail.118 As a rule, the industry opposed any efforts to
change a bail system that so steadily generated exorbitant profits based on
poor people paying to get out of jail.119

of the presumption[ of innocence]’s diminution are apparent and troubling. The number of
defendants held pretrial has steadily increased such that the majority of people in our nation’s jails
have not been convicted of any crime.” (footnote omitted)).
112. See Starger, supra note 43, at 4 fig. 1 (reproducing Prison Policy Initiative graphic on rise
in pretrial incarcerated population). While the COVID pandemic did initially cause a significant
drop in pretrial incarcerated populations, jail populations have already begun to rebound to their
pre-pandemic levels. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie
2022,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
14,
2022),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2022.html#covid; see also infra notes 141–142.
113. An analysis of large urban counties found that nearly 90% of felony defendants in pretrial
detention were detained because of their inability to meet the financial conditions to secure their
release. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES,
2009
–
STATISTICAL
TABLES
15
(2013),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
114. See infra notes 117–121 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 122–139 and accompanying text.
116. See Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 43.
117. A 2017 report noted that Maryland ranks third in the country for campaign contributions
from the bail bonds industry, with more than $288,000 in donations between 2011 and January
2017. For two Maryland Senate chairs who oversee the committees addressing bail bond issues,
contributions from the bail bonds industry constituted more than ten percent of their respective
fundraising totals. COMMON CAUSE MD., PAY TO PLAY? HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS SEEK
INFLUENCE IN ANNAPOLIS 1–2 (2017), https://www.commoncause.org/maryland/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2018/03/pay-to-play-report.docx. Although this report covers a later time
period, the dynamics of financial influence and well-resourced lobbying were also prevalent as early
as 1998.
118. See ABELL FOUND., THE PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL SYSTEM 18, 41–45 (2001), https://abell.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/hhs_pretrial_9.011.pdf (estimating statewide earnings of the bail bond
industry between $42.5 and $170 million from professional surety bonds in 1998).
119. Id. at 41.
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Bail industry opposition to change included efforts to defeat legislation
aiming to grant the right to counsel at the initial bail hearing.120 Starting in
1998 and continuing through the 2002 legislative session, a diverse reform
coalition formed and testified in Annapolis in favor of extending indigent
defendants’ right to counsel at the initial bail hearing.121 But the reformers
proved no match for the industry’s influence in the Maryland legislature.
Eventually, pretrial justice advocates engaged in years-long litigation,
initially culminating in 2012 when the Maryland Court of Appeals
recognized indigent defendants’ statutory right to counsel at the initial
appearance.122 Yet this victory was immediately undermined by legislators
who enacted a revised law that effectively repealed the high court ruling.123
More litigation followed. The high court eventually decided the
constitutional issue, holding that accused indigents did indeed have a right to
counsel at the initial bail proceeding.124 While this represented progress in
principle, in practice the ruling has had less impact than hoped: Evidence
suggests that 90% of detainees in some counties and 50% and higher in others
waive their constitutional right to counsel at initial appearances to obtain an
immediate hearing and avoid further incarceration based on the false belief
that waiver of counsel will secure their release more quickly.125
120. As recently as 1998, only eight states guaranteed counsel’s advocacy to defend and protect
an accused’s liberty before trial. See Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 43, at
1724.
121. The story is laid out in detail in Douglas L. Colbert, The Maryland Access to Justice Story:
Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel at First Appearance, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 1 (2015). The coalition included support and testimony on behalf of then-Chief
Judge Joseph F. Murphy of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and representatives of the
Maryland judiciary, bar association, and State Police; the private criminal defense bar, civil rights
organizations, and legal academics also advocated for the necessity of indigent defendants’ early
representation. Id. at 21–26. While the bail bond industry represented the strongest opposition, the
Maryland Office of the Public Defender also testified against the bill. Id. at 21–22.
122. DeWolfe v. Richmond (DeWolfe I), 434 Md. 403, 430–31, 76 A.3d 962, 978 (2012)
(holding that under Maryland’s Public Defender Act, indigent defendants’ representation by
appointed counsel commences at the initial appearance bail determination stage, based on the plain
language of the Act that representation shall be provided in “all stages” of proceedings).
123. See S.B. 165, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012); see also H.B. 112, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012).
Under the new law, a mandatory right to counsel no longer existed at initial appearances. Legislators
delayed counsel’s representation until the subsequent bail review hearing. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 16-204(b)(2) (West 2012) (“Representation is not required to be provided to an indigent
individual at an initial appearance before a District Court commissioner.”); see also Colbert, supra
note 121, at 45 (explaining the legislative response to DeWolfe I).
124. DeWolfe v. Richmond (DeWolfe II), 434 Md. 444, 456, 76 A.3d 1019, 1026 (2013); MD.
CONST., Decl. of Rts., art. 24; see also DeWolfe I, 434 Md. at 421–22, 76 A.3d at 972–73 (declining
to address the constitutional claims raised in the case because the issue could be addressed based on
statutory language).
125. COMMISSION TO REFORM MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM: FINAL REPORT 1, 10 (2014),
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/020000/020731/unrestrict
ed/20150070e.pdf. Unfortunately, the judiciary has refused to investigate why so many relinquish
such a fundamental right. Anecdotal accounts suggest that commissioners obtain waivers at closed
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The pattern of reform gaining hold only to be undermined by system
actors becomes even sharper after examining the struggle to end cash bail.
The predatory nature of cash bail and its disproportionate impact on poor
people of color has been long known.126 In 2004, reformers won a battle to
change judicial rules to provide low-income detainees an alternative to
paying bail bondsmen’s non-refundable fee.127 The idea was to permit
detainees to make a ten percent cash deposit directly to the court where it
would be refunded once the case concluded instead of paying the same nonrefundable amount to bondsmen.128 The bail bond industry obviously viewed
the proposal as “bad for business” but could not entirely defeat it. In the end,
a divided sub-committee reached a compromise: It mandated the ten percent
cash deposit but only for smaller bonds of $2,500 or less.129 For higher bonds,
a judge could exercise discretion, but the ten percent was not required. Judges
regularly provided a full bond without a cash percentage option.130
Yet even this compromised reform effort soon floundered. While judges
initially appeared to accept the rule changes, they soon employed ways to
subvert the $2,500 mandatory ten percent cash option.131 Several judges
began ordering bond amounts not previously seen, such as $2,501, $2,550,
$2,600 or $3,000.132 The judges’ purpose could not be more apparent: They
court sessions where they tell defendants, appearing without counsel, that they can return to jail and
wait for assigned lawyers to appear or opt to have the hearing right at that moment and be listened
to carefully and given a fair decision.
During 2015–2021 when the right to counsel at first appearance commenced, an astonishing
two out of three Maryland incarcerated defendants relinquished their right to counsel and selfrepresented when first appearing before a District Court Commissioner. MD. DIST. CT., INITIAL
APPEARANCE STATISTICS (2022). Indeed, in 20 of the 24 statewide judicial districts, more than four
out of five detainees waived counsel. Id. In comparison, only two Maryland counties—Baltimore
and Montgomery—each having the greatest number of detainees had the lowest waiver rate;
Baltimore clearly led the way with “only” one in four detainees choosing to appear without a lawyer.
Id.
126. Sean Kennedy, Abolish Rule, Fix Bail, BALT. SUN. (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-bail-rule-con-20170404-story.html.
See
generally Adureh Onyekwere, How Cash Bail Works, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-cash-bail-works.
127. Colbert, supra note 121, at 32–34.
128. Id. at 30. The plan allowed for a small administrative fee to cover costs of running the
program and would not return deposits to defendants who failed to appear.
129. MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(4)(B) (West 2017) (“[I]f the judicial officer sets bail at $2500 or less, the
judicial officer shall advise the defendant that the defendant may post a bail a bail bond secured by
either a corporate surety or a cash deposit of 10% of the full penalty amount . . . .”).
130. MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(M) (“[S]pecial conditions of release imposed by a judicial officer
under this Rule may include, to the extent appropriate and capable of implementation . . . execution
of a bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer secured by the deposit of collateral security
equal in value to not more than 10% of the penalty amount of the bond or by the obligation of a
surety, including a surety insurer, acceptable to the judicial officer . . . .”).
131. Colbert, supra note 121, at 34–35. Judges were setting bail at amounts that left defendants
ineligible to make the percent deposits in court.
132. Id. at 34–35.
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wanted to force poor and low-income defendants to retain a bondsman’s
services and pay the non-refundable ten percent fee. This behavior was best
explained by implicit bias. Judges did not trust poor, predominantly Black
defendants to act responsibly and return to court without the “services” of a
bondsman.133 Similar cynical actions by judges prevented the 2004 rules
change from substantially improving the lot of defendants.134
The next major round of Maryland pretrial reform efforts occurred in
2016. By this time, a national conversation around ending the practice of
unaffordable money bail had started picking up steam.135 National campaigns
to eliminate money bail intersected with burgeoning movements to confront
and end mass incarceration and it again seemed as if change were possible.
At the urging of activists and campaigners, the Maryland Rules Committee
recommended revising judicial procedures that previously had relied

133. It is no coincidence that the history of bail bondsmen overlaps with the history of slave
catching. Benjamin Weber, Beyond Money Bail, VERA INST. OF JUST. (June 27, 2018),
https://www.vera.org/blog/beyond-money-bail (“The private industry of man-hunting, for instance,
grew because there was money to be made from capturing and jailing black people who were alleged
to be fugitives, called dangerous, or appeared out of place . . . profits flowed to government and
private actors when enslaved people were booked and released, hired out, or caged for ‘safekeeping.’”).
134. Several judges initiated an additional cruel and mean-spirited financial condition of a “cashonly” bond to keep low-income—the unemployed and homeless, often veterans living on
government benefits—and predominantly Black defendants in jail typically on non-violent charges.
Previously, defendants’ families were often forced to forego paying rent and posted the “cash-only”
option in order to bring home a needed breadwinner or caretaker. That left the prisoner with the
difficult Hobson’s choice: ask their family to pay the bondsman’s non-refundable fee from money
designated for necessities, or, remain incarcerated. Many decided to remain in jail. In some instances
where defendants were able to ask their family for help, judges attached a further, virtually
impossible condition, “cash only, defendant only.” This effectively made it impossible for
incarcerated defendants to post the necessary bail.
135. See, e.g., Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21 (Erik Luna ed., 2017);
SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN
AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 157–85 (2018); Zina Makar, Bail Reform Begins with the
Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/opinion/bail-reformbegins-with-the-bench.html; Alan Feuer, Bronx Charity Founder Wants to Pay Bail for Poor
Defendants
Nationwide,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/13/nyregion/bail-project-fund-poor-defendants.html
(describing a multi-city effort to leverage nearly $30 million in funding to pay bail for indigent
pretrial defendants). Organizations such as the Civil Rights Corps and Equal Justice Under Law
have challenged unfair money bail practices through litigation. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cnty.,
892 F.3d 147, 157 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming the district court’s rulings that the county’s bail system,
which failed to achieve individualized assessments when setting bail, violates equal protection and
due process, although basing its due process conclusion on different reasoning), overruled on other
grounds by Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522, 540 (5th Cir. 2022); Buffin v. City & County of
San Francisco, No. 15-cv-04959, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34253, at *57 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019)
(finding that the jurisdiction’s use of a bail schedule that arbitrarily assigns bail amounts based on
offense type and fails to consider risk factors significantly deprives indigent defendants of their
fundamental right to liberty).
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substantially upon money bail;136 the new rules required judges to prioritize
non-financial conditions of release and to order money bond only as a last
resort for low-income defendants.137 The revised procedures took effect on
July 1, 2017.138
Once more, what initially appeared as a major victory turned out
differently. Despite the clear language indicating judges could order money
bail as a last resort, judges typically interpreted the revised rule to require that
they choose either release on non-financial conditions or pretrial
incarceration. During the next two-and-a-half years, changes occurred that
can best be described as a good-news, bad-news scenario: Though judges
decreased by six-fold their use of money bail (the good news), they offset
that substantial reduction by increasing four-fold the percentage of
defendants held without bail (the bad news).139 As shown in Figure 5 below,
the net result was a minimal decrease in the pretrial jail population across
Maryland, not nearly the major impact expected from severely limiting the
use of money bail.

136. See Ovetta Wiggins, Bail Reform in Maryland Clears Major Hurdle, WASH. POST (Nov.
18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/bail-reform-in-maryland-clearsmajor-hurdle/2016/11/18/374c5340-ac22-11e6-8b45-f8e493f06fcd_story.html; STANDING COMM.
ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULES CHANGES 2 (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/reports/192nd.pdf.
137. MD. R. 4-216.1(b)–(c) (“[U]nless the judicial officer finds that no permissible non-financial
condition attached to a release will reasonably ensure (A) the appearance of the defendant, and (B)
the safety of each alleged victim, other persons, or the community, the judicial officer shall release
a defendant on personal recognizance or unsecured bond . . . .”). Despite the high court’s clear
language authorizing reasonable bail as a third option, some judges in our study incorrectly stated
in court that the rules only gave them two choices: to release defendants (ROR) or to order
defendants detained to jail (HWOB). For a further discussion on the troubling issue of money bail,
see generally Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo & Dane Thorley, Pretrial Disparity and the Consequences
of Money Bail, 81 MD. L. REV. 557 (2022).
138. MD. R. 4-216.1 (effective July 1, 2017; amended effective July 1, 2021).
139. Since the 2016 rule change, Maryland has seen the proportion of defendants held without
bail skyrocket while the unaffordable bail problem has decreased. Letter from Debra Gardner, Legal
Dir., Pub. Just. Ctr., to Daniel A. Friedman, Judge, Md. Ct. Spec. App., Chair, Rules Rev.
Subcomm., Equal Just. Comm. (July 1, 2021), http://www.publicjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/CSJM-submission-on-pretrial-detention-to-CEJ-Rules-ReviewSubcommittee-7-1-21.pdf. Within three months of the implementation of Rule 4-216.1, the
percentage of individuals held without bail rose to 25.1%, compared to 6.7% just fifteen months
prior. Id. at 2.
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Figure 5
Maryland Jail Population January 2016–August 2020140

The vertical red line on the lefthand side of Figure 5 represents when
the new pretrial rule went into effect on July 1, 2017. As the figure shows,
the pretrial population (represented by the orange and green lines) was
essentially stable from this time right up until March 2020—when the
pandemic struck. However, the graphic also shows how the early days of the
pandemic resulted in more pretrial defendants being held for longer periods,
even as the 1–90 days pretrial population dipped. By the time this Article’s
study began in June 2020 (shown by the vertical purple line on the right of
the figure), the overall pretrial incarcerated population was already beginning
to rise again. By 2021, as shown in Figure 6 below, Baltimore City’s average
daily pretrial population had essentially returned to pre-pandemic levels.141

140. The data displayed in Figure 5 comes directly from the Maryland Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”). The data track jail populations for every county in
Maryland, with pretrial populations logged separately, as of the first day of each month from January
2016 through August 2020. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 96–97.
141. See DPSCS Annual Data Dashboard, MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS.,
https://dpscs.maryland.gov/community_releases/DPSCS-Annual-Data-Dashboard.shtml
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2022) (data found on page 1 of 8 on the dashboard; figures for average daily
population available in top right chart). The average daily pretrial population dipped from 2342 to
2140 from 2019–2020, but then rose back to 2359 in 2021. Id. For code to create this data
visualization, see Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 98.
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Figure 6
Baltimore City Pretrial Average Daily Population 2016–2021

Of course, the story about how hoped-for decarceration did not
materialize in Baltimore has already been related.142 Given the history of
failed reform related above, this should perhaps have been unsurprising.
Time and again, focused efforts at improving the pretrial system have seemed
to move two steps forward only to stumble one or more steps back. Yet
somehow the promise of “this time it will be different” rarely fades from
liberal discourse. This is the virus conceptual metaphor at work, hiding
simple truth.143 Many reformers perceive the system they are trying to reform
as otherwise righteous. They suggest that the institutions of justice merely
need course correction to get back on track, focused interventions to get the
body politic healthy. Yet experience time and again suggests that systemic
racism is a feature, not a bug. Inequality is in our institutional DNA.

142. See supra Part I. The Baltimore data is consistent with national trends. As noted by the
Prison Policy Initiative, “Jail populations dropped early in the pandemic, mostly due to reduced
admissions. However, as the pandemic drug on, jail populations steadily climbed, nearly back to
their pre-pandemic levels.” See COVID-19 in Prisons and Jails, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 3,
2022), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/ (surveying national data). While prison populations
have seen an average 15% drop in population since the beginning of the pandemic, id., the data give
every indication that mass incarceration is returning to “business as usual.” See Sawyer & Wagner,
supra note 111.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3.
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B. Baltimore’s Black Butterfly
If focused reform only results in cycles of failure, then perhaps focused
academic inquiry only answers less-than-useful questions. Might broadening
the inquiry beyond domain expertise bring a bigger picture of structural
inequality into view? Here it bears repeating that the most pronounced racial
disparity observed in our study appeared in the initial defendant population
(83% Black versus 12% white) rather than in bail outcomes (63% Black
HWOB versus 56% white HWOB).144 While the onus for the racial disparity
of arrestees entering the pretrial system may not fall on the shoulders of
judges and other pretrial actors, this cannot absolve those actors of
responsibility for failing to confront this structural inequality. If pretrial
actors unthinkingly accept racial imbalance of pretrial defendants as given,
then pretrial actors will unthinkingly reproduce and exacerbate inequality.145
Premises need to be questioned. Connections between subsystems in the
larger system need to be understood.
One way to visualize connections involves geo-spatial mapping, a
process wherein address data is converted into latitude and longitude
coordinates and then overlaid onto open-source images of a given
geographical area.146 Figure 7 below was created by plotting Baltimore Cityresiding defendants based on addresses taken from public court records onto
maps of Baltimore.147

144. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 99–101.
145. Here it bears emphasis that the pretrial system did indeed exacerbate inequality. Because
Black people were arrested and detained at higher rates, this resulted in 85% of all people held
without bail being Black. Id. ¶ 102. Only 11% of those suffering pretrial detention were white. Id.
In a city that is 27% white and where so much wealth and power is concentrated in white hands, the
very low percentage of detainees who were white speaks volumes. See id.
146. Prior to the advent of Google Maps, this process was arcane and expensive. Now, however,
all it takes is a little computer coding know-how to create geo-spatial data displays. Even law
professors can do it! See generally id.
147. Of the 509 defendants in the study, 429 had Baltimore City addresses (83%). See id. ¶¶ 104–
05. The racial breakdown is similar to the larger study—85% Black (362), 11% white (45) and 4%
other (18). See id. ¶¶ 106–10.
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Figure 7
Residences of Baltimore Defendants by Race148

The pattern of defendants’ geo-spatial distribution immediately evokes
the Black butterfly. As noted in the Introduction, Dr. Lawrence Brown
famously coined the Black butterfly term to describe the pattern of
hypersegregation in Baltimore.149 In its simplest sense, the butterfly shape
shows where Black Baltimoreans live. The butterfly, however, is “more than
a demographic description;” it signifies a deeper “political, economic, and
sociocultural” reality.150 For the neighborhoods where Black residents are
geographically clustered represent the same neighborhoods where “capital is
denied and structural disadvantages have accumulated due to the lack of
capital access.”151 Critically, the Black butterfly has a counterpart—the
“white L,” which describes both where white Baltimoreans live and “where
access to capital is most readily available and structural advantages have

148. See id. ¶ 103.
149. See generally BROWN, BLACK BUTTERFLY, supra note 22. Brown specifically builds on
Douglas Massey and Jonathan Tannen’s work, which classifies as “hypersegregated” those
metropolitan areas where African Americans are segregated along at least four of five dimensions:
(1) unevenness (the degree to which Blacks and whites are unevenly distributed across
neighborhoods); (2) isolation (the extent to which African Americans live in predominantly Black
neighborhoods); (3) clustering (the degree to which neighborhoods inhabited by African Americans
are clustered together in space); (4) concentration (the relative amount of physical space occupied
by African Americans within a given metropolitan environment; and (5) centralization (the degree
to which Blacks reside near the center of a metropolitan area). Id. at 12 n.18 (citing Massey &
Tannen, supra note 22, at 1025–34).
150. See id. at 9.
151. Id.
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accrued.”152 The Black butterfly thus represents the blueprint of a system that
confers advantage to some and metes out disadvantage to others. It evokes a
deeper pattern of inequality that cuts across economic, political, and other
socio-cultural systems. The Black butterfly is systemic, institutional, and
structural.
Is the distribution of study defendants connected to this profound racial
and geographic concept? Or is the butterfly-like resemblance of images in
Figure 7 just a visual coincidence? Such questions find answers in an
extraordinary and authoritative data source. For over twenty years, the
Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance (“BNIA”) has collected and
geospatially coded Baltimore citywide data into 55 Community Statistical
Areas (“CSAs”).153 CSAs provide a rich and consistent lens through which
to view and compare “vital signs” of Baltimore’s neighborhoods.154
One of the key indicators tracked by BNIA is the percentage of a
neighborhood that is African American (“PAA”).155 Figure 8 below is a
“choropleth” display of the percentage of the PAA indicator based on 2020
Census data.156 Choropleths, commonly known as “heat maps,” show how
much of a particular variable exists in an area using darker or lighter color
shades. In the case of Figure 8, the darker purple color indicates a high
concentration of African Americans in a neighborhood and a light-yellow
color indicates the opposite. The darkest purple color on the maps is in the
Greater Rosemont neighborhood, which is 94% Black. The lightest yellow
color is in the Canton neighborhood, which is 4% Black. The segregation
shown by this figure is thus extreme—the extremity shows hyper-segregation
in Baltimore and the basic butterfly pattern.
152. Id. at 14.
153. See Vital Signs: Community Statistical Areas, BALT. NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS ALL.,
https://bniajfi.org/communities/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2022) (“BNIA-JFI uses the 55 Community
Statistical Areas (CSAs) to present a wide range of data from multiple sources as well as providing
data for Baltimore City in a consistent way over time. Clustering neighborhoods into CSAs was
necessary since most of the 270+ neighborhoods in Baltimore City do not have boundaries that fall
along census tracts. As the city changes, Baltimore residents may shift their neighborhood’s
boundaries or even change its name. Neighborhood lines often do not fall along CSA boundaries
but CSAs are a consistent representation of the conditions occurring within particular
neighborhoods.”).
154. Though BNIA data has long been available, its key indicators had not previously been
mapped side-by-side to show the persistent pattern. In early stages of this project, Colin Starger
wrote a computer program to read BNIA’s CSA data and generate graphical images and
mathematical matrices represented how inequalities are distributed between Baltimore
neighborhoods. This work was presented at BNIA’s 2021 “Data Week.” See Donte Kirby, So You
Want to Be a Software Developer? How to Use Open Data with Your Code, TECHNICAL.LY (July
23, 2021, 2:43 PM), https://technical.ly/baltimore/2021/07/23/open-data-code-bnia/ (analyzing
BNIA Data Week presentation by Starger explaining Black butterfly stack and providing links to
underlying sources).
155. Though this Article generally employs the term “Black,” we present the BNIA data and
indicators using BNIA’s own terms. In this case, BNIA employs the term “African American.”
156. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 111–12.
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Figure 8
Basic Butterfly Pattern by PAA Indicator

Going further, the relationship between the butterfly pattern seen by
mapping the PAA indicator and study defendants can be visualized and
represented mathematically. Figure 9 below shows the distribution of all
Baltimore City study defendants overlaid on the Figure 8 choropleth. It is
immediately obvious that study defendants largely reside in Black butterfly
neighborhoods rather than white L neighborhoods. A more precise
mathematical expression of this same relationship is correlation.157
Specifically, the correlation between PAA neighborhoods and all study
Baltimore defendant neighborhoods can be expressed by a single number,
known as a correlation coefficient. In this case, the correlation coefficient is
.62.158

157. For an excellent introductory discussion of correlation, see generally CHARLES WHEELAN,
NAKED STATISTICS: STRIPPING THE DREAD FROM THE DATA 58–67 (2013). As Wheelan explains:
[T]he power of correlation as a statistical tool is that we can encapsulate an association
between two variables in a single descriptive statistic: the correlation coefficient. The
correlation coefficient has two fabulously attractive characteristics. First . . . it is a
single number ranging from -1 to 1. A correlation of 1, often described as perfect
correlation, means that every change in one variable is associated with an equivalent
change in the other variable in the same direction . . . . The second attractive feature of
the correlation coefficient is that it has no units attached to it. We can [for example]
calculate the correlation between height and weight—even though height is measured
in inches and weight is measured in pounds.
Id. at 60.
158. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 116. We used the “Pearson” correlation (other types
of correlation include “Kendall” and “Spearman”). See pandas.Dataframe.corr, PANDAS
https://pandas.pydata.org/docs/reference/api/pandas.DataFrame.corr.html (last visited June 23,
2022) (documenting Pandas code for calculating correlations).
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Figure 9
All Defendants and the Black Butterfly159

What does a correlation coefficient of .62 mean? Correlation
coefficients can be thought of as a range from 0 to 1, where 0 is “no
correlation” and 1 is “perfect correlation.”160 Any correlation coefficient
above .5 is considered “high correlation.”161 Thus, a .62 correlation
coefficient between PAA neighborhoods and all study Baltimore defendant
neighborhoods is high. This high correlation, in turn, suggests that the
butterfly pattern seen in the defendant pretrial population distribution is not
the product of coincidence, visual or otherwise.
Further evidence of the non-coincidental nature of the relationship
between the Black butterfly and pretrial defendants can be seen in Figure 10,
which illustrates the distribution of just Black defendants in the study. When
refined this way, the correlation coefficient rises from .62 to .73.162 In other
words, the correlation is even higher between Black defendants in the study
and Black neighborhoods. While the fact that Black defendants in our study
came from Black neighborhoods is itself unsurprising, the increase in degree
of correlation usefully demonstrates both how confidence in propositions
asserted can rise to a higher correlation level and how multiple correlations
work to negate the possibility that an asserted relationship merely derives
from chance.163
159. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 117, for the data and code used to produce Figure 9.
160. Correlations technically range from -1 to 1, where negative numbers indicate “negative
correlation” (when one variable goes up, the other variable goes down). Any number less than -.5
is considered a high negative correlation,
161. See
Pearson’s
Correlation
Coefficient,
STATS.
SOLS.,
https://www.statisticssolutions.com/free-resources/directory-of-statistical-analyses/pearsonscorrelation-coefficient/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2022). Coefficients between .3 and .49 are considered
“moderate”; less than .3 is “low” correlation. Id.
162. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 116, 118.
163. Concern that an observed correlation results from chance undergirds the oft-repeated truism
that correlation is not causation. Without question, we run the risk of being “fooled by randomness”
if we discount the possibility observed mathematical relationships between two variables are
coincidental. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHӦNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 53 (2014)
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Figure 10
Black Defendants and the Black Butterfly164

This brings us to a bottom line. The proposition now asserted is that the
correlation between study defendants and the Black butterfly demonstrates
how both patterns ultimately derive from the same underlying system. No
matter how one chooses to label this underlying system—really a set of
overlapping and intersecting systems—it reflects the operation of structures
and institutions that have long reproduced inequality in predictable ways. The
basic pattern of the Black butterfly and the pattern of study defendants echo

(attributing the phrase “fooled by randomness” to empiricist Nassim Nicholas Taleb). Yet as the
number of variables and datapoints observed increases, the probability that observed relationships
result from pure chance decreases. See id. at 71 (exploring the Chris Anderson quote: “With enough
data, the numbers speak for themselves. Petrabytes allow us to say: ‘Correlation is enough.’”).
Correlation in these circumstances can be trusted to reveal precisely what is happening in the world
(albeit not neatly why). The BNIA-CSA data presented in the next Part exemplify this point. The
asserted relationship between percentages of African Americans in city neighborhoods and markers
of inequality derive from multiple variables that are all highly correlated to each other. The
probability that the observed patterns derive from coincidence or randomness in this context
approach zero. This is especially true given what we know about American history from slavery to
the Civil War and from Reconstruction to redlining. See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE
WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW
WE CAN FIX IT (2021); BROWN, BLACK BUTTERFLY, supra note 22; MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (10th anniversary ed.,
2020) (connecting slavery and the Jim Crow era to contemporary mass incarceration and the
criminal legal system as instruments of a racial caste system); ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY
NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A GREAT AMERICAN CITY (2010) (examining the
ongoing effects of real estate discrimination in American cities, particularly in Baltimore); Peggy
Cooper Davis, Anderson Francois & Colin Starger, The Persistence of the Confederate Narrative,
84 TENN. L. REV. 301 (2017) (analyzing the relationship between assertions of civil rights and calls
for the protection of local autonomy and control and the jurisprudential effects); MELVIN L. OLIVER
& THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY (10th anniversary ed., 2006) (analyzing the racial wealth gap in America and the
failure of public policies to address the problem). In short, the links between class, race, and
persistent inequality shown by the data are undeniable even if the precise mechanics of causation
remain elusive.
164. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 119.
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the replicating pattern of structural racism in Baltimore. It’s in the DNA of
the city.
III. THE DNA OF STRUCTURAL RACISM IN BALTIMORE
This Part dives deeper into the DNA metaphor using BNIA data and
geo-spatial mapping. The Black butterfly pattern recurs in other economic,
social, and cultural indicators collected by BNIA and made publicly
available. Although these indicators do not on the surface track criminal
justice concerns, the point is that any attempt to understand or reform the
criminal legal system without consciousness of these non-criminal indicators
will inevitably end in familiar failure. It is simply not possible to silo criminal
justice away from “non-criminal” economic, social, and cultural systems.
Dots need to be connected. At the same time, exclusive reliance on abstract
data risks obscuring the day-to-day human impact of the system critiqued.
Put differently, the defendants in our study are not just dots on a map. They
are real people; many suffered real injustice. To keep the troubling reality of
their individual experiences ever present, this Part therefore also intersperses
numerical analysis with storytelling.
Figure 11
Percent of Population Using Public Transportation to Travel to
Work

This Part’s inquiry begins with Figure 11, above, which shows a
choropleth for BNIA’s public transportation indicator.165 As its name
suggests, the public transportation indicator shows the percentage of
neighborhood residents who take public transportation to work. The
neighborhood with the highest percentage of residents taking public
transportation is Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park (42%) and the lowest is
Canton (4%).166
165. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 123. The indicator pubtran19 is based on 2019 data.
166. See id. ¶ 124. The Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood was where Freddie Gray lived. Of
course, Freddie Gray’s death in police custody led to widespread protests and “unrest” in Baltimore.

42

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:1

Note that although the shapes of the leftmost and rightmost maps
strongly resemble the Black butterfly and white L, they do not precisely
match. This is the result of a design choice to help contrast indicator data.
The leftmost map always shows the thirty-seven neighborhoods with highest
indicator values whereas the rightmost map shows the eighteen
neighborhoods with the lowest indicator values (a two-thirds to one-third
split across fifty-five neighborhoods). Thus, the variation seen between the
Black butterfly and the public transportation maps is because the two-thirds
of neighborhoods with the highest percentage of African American residents
do not exactly align with the two-thirds of neighborhoods with the highest
percentage of residents who take public transportation. Though not the same,
it bears emphasis that the percentage of African American residents and
public transportation indicators are highly correlated. Indeed, their
correlation coefficient is .69.167 As a reminder, any number higher than .5
signifies high correlation, with 1 being “perfect” correlation.
Given that the public transportation indicator is highly correlated to the
Black butterfly, and that the Black butterfly is highly correlated to study
defendants, it seems a safe bet that public transportation would be highly
correlated to study defendants. And indeed, it is. The all-Baltimore
defendant/public transportation coefficient is .62.168 Figure 12 below
visualizes this correlation.
Figure 12
All Defendants and Public Transportation

Putting math and pictures to the side, does public transportation have
anything to do with the pretrial legal system? Indirectly and directly, it does.
The language used to describe those events was hotly contested at the time, though now it is best
remembered as “the Baltimore uprising.” For more on Freddie Gray and the uprising, see Justine
Barron, Freddie Gray, Five Years Later, APPEAL (Apr. 23, 2020), https://theappeal.org/freddiegray-five-years-later/.
167. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 125.
168. Id. ¶ 126. Unsurprisingly, the correction between public transportation and Black
defendants in the study is even higher: .66. Id. ¶ 127.
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Indirectly, needing to take public transportation generally relates to poverty
and class, and poverty and class (as explored immediately below169) has
everything to do with the criminal legal system. Directly, the fact that many
Baltimore criminal defendants rely highly on public transportation means
that getting to and from court dates can prove challenging. Due to a long and
profoundly anti-Black history, public transportation in Baltimore is slow,
sparse, and unreliable.170 When court dates are missed because of unreliable
transportation, warrants issue and criminal records grow longer.171
Defendants with missed court dates are more likely to be denied pretrial
release. Public transportation woes thus form part of the vicious cycles of
structural racism.
Turning now to the question of poverty and class, consider the BNIA
indicator relating to the median household income of Baltimore’s
neighborhoods. This indicator is highly correlated to the two variables
already discussed: percentage of African American residents (correlation
coefficient of -.76) and public transportation (correlation coefficient of .77).172 Median household income is also highly correlated to all Baltimore
City study defendants (-.57).173 Here the raw numbers speak volumes about
the depth of Baltimore’s inequality. The median household income of the
richest, predominantly white neighborhood per this indicator (Canton) is
$128,460 per year.174 On the other end of the scale, the median household
income of the disproportionately Black Upton/Druid Heights is $21,319 per
year.175 This is a six-fold difference.

169. See infra text accompanying notes 172–175.
170. Professor Sheryll Cashin pointedly recounts this troubling history and its relationship to
Baltimore’s segregation. See SHERRYL CASHIN, WHITE SPACE, BLACK HOOD: OPPORTUNITY
HOARDING AND SEGREGATION IN THE AGE OF INEQUALITY 21–33 (2021).
171. In our experience, we have even seen judges issue FTA warrants when defendants arrived
late and failed to answer a 9:15 AM calendar call. This seemed unnecessarily harsh and failed to
take into account transportation issues.
172. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 129. Note that the negative coefficient numbers here
signify negative correlation—as median income goes up, the percentage of residents who are
African American or take public transportation goes down. Negative correlation works in exactly
the same way as positive correlation.
173. Id.
174. Id. ¶ 130.
175. Id.
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Figure 13
Median Household Income and All Defendants

Figure 13 visualizes the median household income choropleth with
Baltimore study defendants overlaid. This graphic also features a red dot in
the middle map. This represents the approximate home address of Herbert
Smath, a Black man charged with a lesser misdemeanor of violating a
protective order, who appeared before Judge Michael Studdard on July 1,
2020. Mr. Smath hailed from the 83% Black, Cedonia/Frankford
neighborhood on the east side of Baltimore, a neighborhood with a median
annual household income of $47,258.176
When Mr. Smath appeared before Judge Studdard, he admitted to
violating a peace order taken out by his foster mother. However, even
Pretrial Services stipulated that it was unclear if the peace order was a
temporary one or final.177 According to Mr. Smath’s defense counsel, since
his client’s birth mother passed away earlier that year, he had struggled with
housing and went to his foster mother’s home to charge his phone.178 Despite
these apparent exigent circumstances and the decidedly low-level nature of
the charge that carried a maximum ninety-day sentence (sixty-two days with
good time credit), Judge Studdard ordered pretrial detention for Mr. Smath.
Maddeningly, Mr. Smath then remained in jail for eighty-five days—more
than three weeks beyond the maximum sentence—until the charge against
him was dismissed on September 24th.179
During the entire time he languished in jail, the law theoretically
presumed Mr. Smath innocent. This theoretical presumption was then
ignored for nearly three months. Given the over-the-maximum sentence for
176. Id. ¶¶ 131–34; Audiotape: Bail Review Hearing, held by the District Court of Maryland for
Baltimore City, Judge Michael S. Studdard (July 1, 2020) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Judge
Studdard Audiotape] (supporting entire narrative that follows). Herbert Smath is a pseudonym.
Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 133–34 (defendant number 268; case number 0B02420565).
177. Judge Studdard Audiotape, supra note 176.
178. Id.
179. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 135.
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the charge he faced, it is hard to imagine any scenario could have justified
the initial no-bail order. It is perhaps harder still to imagine what it felt like
for Mr. Smath to spend eighty-five days in jail during the early uncertain time
of the COVID pandemic, accused of doing minor things that seemed
necessary to deal with life struggles, only to have all charges
unceremoniously dropped. Eighty-five days behind bars for no good reason.
This would not likely have happened to an affluent white person. The same
system that permits a poor Black Cedonia/Frankford resident to be detained
unnecessarily for eighty-five days, would surely not allow an affluent white
Roland Park resident to experience the same fate. This is the meaning of
white privilege.
To review, this Part has so far used three BNIA indicators—paa20
(percentage of African American residents in 2020), pubtran19 (percentage
of residents taking public transportation to work), and mhhi19 (median
annual household income)—to measure the production and reproduction of
inequality in Baltimore. Not only do these indicators all show high
correlation to study defendants, they also show a high correlation to each
other. The interrelated nature of the indicator correlations is shown in Figure
14.
Figure 14
Correlation Matrix (paa, pubtran, mhhi)180
paa20
pubtran19
mhhi19
All Defs

paa20
1.0
0.69
-0.76
0.62

pubtran19
0.69
1.0
-0.77
0.62

mhhi19
-0.76
-0.77
1.0
-0.57

All Defs
0.62
0.62
-0.57
1.0

That these indicators in Figure 14 “move together” suggest that they
express different aspects of the same system. This hints at “the system” of
systemic racism. Of course, far more than three indicators point towards this
system. Using the same matrix technique as above, three additional indicators
can quickly be introduced. These additional indicators similarly quantify
inequality between neighborhoods. As seen in Figure 15, they are tanf19
(percentage of families in neighborhoods receiving Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families), nohhint (percentage of households with no home internet),
and voted18 (percentage of the over-18 population in a neighborhood who
voted in the 2018 gubernatorial general election).

180. Id. ¶ 136.
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Figure 15
Correlation Matrix (tanf, nohhint, voted)181
tanf19
nohhint19
voted18
All Defs

tanf19
1.0
0.72
-0.81
0.58

nohhint19
0.72
1.0
-0.79
0.61

voted18
-0.81
-0.79
1.0
-0.6

All Defs
0.58
0.61
-0.6
1.0

Once again, the indicators are all interrelated. Neighborhoods with
relatively high percentages of families receiving federal TANF assistance
also have relatively high percentages of households with no home internet.182
Both these indicators, in turn, have a strong negative correlation to voting—
residents of neighborhoods that lack home internet and require TANF at
higher rents vote less.183 And all three indicators correlate with the defendants
in our study. The poverty expressed by TANF, the disinvestment expressed
by lack of home internet, and the disempowerment expressed by low voting
rates are related to who ends up as a criminal defendant in Baltimore City.
This is no coincidence.
By now, the DNA-like replicating nature of inequality in Baltimore
should be apparent. It bears repeating that BNIA tracks many more indicators
of race and class inequality than introduced already. Yet rather than
overwhelm with endless detail, let us instead consider a single final revealing
indicator—life expectancy. Figure 16 below shows the life expectancy
choropleth with study defendants overlaid. The correlation coefficient
between life expectancy and study defendant neighborhoods is high and
negative: -.65.184 This means neighborhoods with high numbers of criminal
defendants have low life expectancy. An even higher negative correlation
exists between Black butterfly neighborhoods and life expectancy (-.68).185
The raw inequality is painful. Residents in the Downtown/Seton Hill
neighborhood can expect to live twenty-two years fewer than residents in
Cross-Country Cheswolde—an average life expectancy of sixty-three years
versus eighty-five years.186 When residents of one neighborhood live twenty-

181. Id. ¶ 137.
182. Id. ¶¶ 137–39. The neighborhood with the highest TANF indicator is Cherry Hill (19%)
and lowest is Canton (<1%). Id. ¶ 138. The highest rate of no home internet is 39% (SandtownWinchester) and lowest is 4% (Greater Roland Park/Poplar Hill). Id.
183. Id. ¶ 137. The neighborhood with lowest percentages of residents voting is Brooklyn/Curtis
Bay/Hawkins Point (28%). Id. ¶ 138. Highest is Greater Roland Park/Poplar Hill (71%). Id.
184. Id. ¶ 141.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 140.

2022]

A BUTTERFLY IN COVID

47

two years fewer than residents of another neighborhood just miles away, it is
like structural robbery of an entire generation.
Figure 16
Life Expectancy and All Defendants

To keep the human experience underlying these grim statistics present,
consider one last story from the study. The red dot in the middle of the center
map above represents the residence of Dionicio Wordrick, a 25-year-old
Black man who appeared before Judge Diana Smith on June 10, 2020. Mr.
Wordrick faced non-violent felony and misdemeanor charges of burglary in
the fourth degree and malicious destruction of property after he got into an
argument with the mother of his child.187 After buzzing him inside her
building for an agreed-to visit, the mother asked for money before she would
allow him to see his child. To avoid an argument, Mr. Wordrick left.
According to his defense lawyer, the mother then slammed the door behind
him, causing slight damage to the door. The mother nonetheless instigated
charges against Mr. Wordrick based on the door damage. Ordering HWOB,
Judge Smith referred to a pending non-violent case with a similar property
charge (with a different complaining witness) and to the fact of a minor child
being present during the incident.188 Judge Smith’s HWOB order resulted in
Mr. Wordrick remaining incarcerated for 106 days before learning that the
charges against him would be dismissed.189
Even if valid, the allegations against Mr. Wordrick hardly justified
detention. At the end of the day, only the door was alleged to have suffered
damage. Though Mr. Wordrick had a minor criminal history, he lived in an
over-surveilled, under-resourced neighborhood where catching a criminal

187. Judge Smith Audiotape, supra note 84 (supporting entire narrative that follows). Dionicio
Wordrick is a pseudonym. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 140–44 (defendant number 82;
case number 2B02416766).
188. Judge Smith Audiotape, supra note 84.
189. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 145.
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case is as easy as catching a cold or COVID-19.190 But Mr. Wordrick’s life
and time was not highly valued by the system. His story was not heard with
sympathy or as anything other than one in an endless chain of hard-luck
excuses. Yet the system’s initial judgment was wrong. The always-flimsy
charges against Mr. Wordrick were fully dropped on September 24th after
three-and-a-half months in jail awaiting trial.
Mr. Wordrick’s story is typical in that it is full of contested details and
particular complications. Yet all of the messiness should not obscure the
injustice suffered. Nor should it obscure that Mr. Wordrick’s injustice is a
typical injustice in Baltimore. It is typical that messy and contested facts are
viewed as evidence in favor of detaining a presumptively innocent person.
Even more critically, such typical injustices are not shared equally across the
city. Rather, they disproportionately fall on communities that suffer other
inequalities. And that suffering is necessary, under structural racism’s twisted
logic, to maintain the peace, tranquility, and prosperity of privileged
spaces.191
IV. CODA AND CONCLUSION
This Article represents a perspective-altering journey for its authors. As
noted in the Introduction, we began this project somewhat in thrall of the
virus metaphor for structural racism. We were optimistic that a focused,
pretrial-specific reform could be successful in confronting the disease of
inequality, and that a focused, pre-trial specific study was the appropriate
way to bring our years of domain expertise to the collective healing effort.
We hoped that the COVID crisis combined with the post-George Floyd
national reckoning on structural racism might finally usher in lasting and
meaningful reform.

190. Id.; cf. Exploring the Impacts of COVID-19 on Baltimore’s Neighborhoods, BALT.
NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS ALL., https://coronavirus-bniajfi.hub.arcgis.com/ (last visited Sept.
23, 2022) (providing a choropleth map indicating the prevalence of COVID-19 in Baltimore City
and County by neighborhood); Maryland COVID-19 Data Dashboard, MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
https://coronavirus.maryland.gov/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2022) (documenting daily reports of
COVID-19 cases in Maryland with a break-down by county and demographics, and indicating that
Black Marylanders accounted for upwards of 30% of all new cases and deaths despite being 12.4%
of the state population); Coronavirus 2019 Disease (COVID-19), BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T (Mar.
24, 2022), https://coronavirus.baltimorecity.gov/ (documenting daily reports of COVID-19 cases in
Baltimore with a break-down by neighborhood and demographics, and indicating that Black
Baltimoreans accounted for approximately 60% of all new cases and upwards of 70% of deaths
despite being 57% of the city population).
191. This point is critical. As Professor Sheryll Cashin has meticulously documented,
“concentrated Black poverty facilitates poverty-free affluent white space . . . . White space would
not exist without the hood and government at all levels created and still reifies this racialized
residential order.” CASHIN, supra note 170, at 6; see also id. at 7 (“While state and private actors
plunder, extract, surveil, and contain in the hood, they overinvest in and protect white space.”). The
inequality of the system makes white privilege—which can also be class privilege—possible.
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Following the June–July 2020 data collection, we devoted the 2020–
2021 school year to tracking cases, analyzing data, and offering preliminary
public feedback in op-ed articles and faculty fora.192 During this period, it
became apparent our optimism had been misplaced. Very little positive
change had occurred and certainly nothing on order of the loftier promises
made during the post-Floyd reckoning. We began to question why we had
ever imagined otherwise and examined our assumptions.
Searching for new ways to comprehend our results, we mapped
defendant data geo-spatially. When the Black butterfly unfolded its wings in
our maps, it changed our direction and perspective. The butterfly prompted
us to “step out of our lane” and consider structural racism more broadly.
Inspired by Dr. Brown’s analysis of the distributive patterns of advantage and
disadvantage in Baltimore City, we sought out BNIA data regarding the
inextricable relationship between institutions of “criminal justice” and other
institutions meting out economic, political, and social-cultural oppression
and opportunity.193 The deeper repeating patterns of inequality provided the
wider lens through which we could view the narrow failure of pretrial reform.
Meanwhile, the pandemic raged on, killing hundreds of thousands.
Vaccines were developed and the nation started to emerge from lockdown.
After suspending jury trials in April 2020, Baltimore courts slowly resumed
trials more than one year later in May 2021.194 That same month, we obtained
permission to take another look at Baltimore’s judicial bail review hearings.
Returning to Wabash Avenue Courtroom Four would function as a Coda to
our original study.
By the summer of 2021, we were no longer optimistic that judges might
have softened the 61.5% detention rate observed in the prior summer of 2020.
Attending 112 bail hearings conducted by ten different district court judges
192. See, e.g., Doug Colbert & Colin Starger, Commentary, Bail Injustice in the Time of COVID19, BALT. SUN (Sept. 7, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op0906-bail-reform-20200907-crgclw6s4jhavmmtdks4ebniqm-story.html; Doug Colbert & Colin
Starger, Commentary, Detention Fees Unfairly Burden Poor People, BALT. SUN (Jan. 29, 2021,
6:24 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op-0129-home-detention-fees20210129-e4v7h723tndklc52gpzbqd62z4-story.html.
193. See supra note 22.
194. On March 12, 2020, then-Chief Judge Barbera suspended jury trials due to the COVID-19
pandemic. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland Administrative Order on the Statewide Suspension
of
Jury
Trials,
MD.
JUDICIARY
(March
12,
2020),
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20200312suspensionofjurytrials.pdf. On April 26, 2021, then-Chief Judge Barbera resumed
jury trials. In the Court of Appeals of Maryland Amended Administrative Order on Expanding
Statewide Judiciary Operations in Light of the COVID-19 Emergency, MD. JUDICIARY (Feb. 16,
2021),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/admin-ordersarchive/20210216amendedorderexpandingstatewidejudiciaryoperationsinlightofthecovid19emerge
ncy.pdf. For over a year, jailed defendants seeking to contest their criminal charges at a jury trial
could only wait in line in their caged cells, while courts systematically postponed cases of those
unwilling to “cop a plea.”
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over ten days in May through June 2021, we discovered that indeed the
situation had only worsened.195 These results bolstered our confidence that
the harshness we had seen in 2020 was not aberrational but reflected a
presumption of incarceration for the accused. The detention rate in 2021 had
now increased to 71%; a mere 29% of defendants regained liberty at bail
review hearings.196 In raw human numbers, this means that a paltry thirtytwo people were granted pretrial freedom while the remaining eighty souls
remained in jail for exceedingly lengthy periods during COVID. This result
was as alarming as it was predictable. Baltimore City judges ordered nearly
three of four presumed-innocent people accused of crime to stay in jail until
their cases were resolved.197
Looking closer, judges released only 16 of the 112 pretrial defendants—
real people with real names and stories—on personal recognizance,198 a clear
sign that judges trusted few of those ensnarled in the criminal legal system to
return to court on their own. The issue of trust might also be labelled implicit
bias, for the data revealed a substantial difference in judges’ treatment of
Black and white detainees. Judges denied bail to 75% of Black defendants
while holding 62% of white defendants without bail.199 And once again, the
bail system only compounded the inequality in policing and prosecution that
brought people to court in the first place—only 8% of defendants were white,
while fully 85% were Black.200 One year later, rank inequality persisted.
Structures, institutions, and systems had not meaningfully changed.
The DNA metaphor presented in the Article emphasizes structural
racism’s apparent tendency to replicate and reproduce inequality across

195. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶¶ 148–52. We attended hearings May 18 to May 21,
May 24 to May 28, and June 1. Id. ¶ 149.
196. Id. ¶ 153. Compared to our summer 2020 study, a higher percentage of 2021 judges
embraced a tougher, lock-’em-up approach. At 2020 bail reviews, six of sixteen (38%) judges held
more than 70% of defendants without bail (“HWOB”). Id. ¶¶ 153, 162–63. One year later, this
minority perspective appeared the dominant position among the city’s district court bench, as seven
of ten judges (70%) denied release to 70% of detainees or more. Id. ¶¶ 153, 164–66. HWOB simply
ruled the day among these judges. Even when a defendant faced non-violent charges and Pretrial or
the prosecution recommended release, liberty was denied. Some judges refused to even consider
“less onerous” options like ROR with supervision, money bail, or home detention. They also
continued to decline to review preset bails or detention orders that docket judges had ordered against
absent defendants without considering the reasons underlying why defendants had failed to appear.
197. The time to trial had slowly started to decrease after courts re-opened. Though the “we want
a jury trial” line inched forward as courts began holding trials, it moved slowly and labored under a
tremendous backlog.
198. See Jupyter Notebook, supra note 5, ¶ 153. Moreover, judges refused to turn to other nonfinancial options to compensate for their under-use of recognizance bonds: Only fourteen people
received an unsecured bond (13%). Id. Beyond this, just one person regained liberty by posting a
money bond and one other person received ROR/home detention. Id.
199. Id. ¶¶ 155–56.
200. Id. ¶ 157.
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institutions and across time.201 We see the metaphor as a useful way to
challenge the dominant liberal view that systemic racism is akin to a virus
attacking an otherwise healthy body. The DNA metaphor suggests the
problem is much more deep-seated, that racism exists in the cells of our social
institutions. Racism is a feature, not a bug. Reforms that do not confront these
deeper patterns and sources of inequality in the system will inevitably fail.
In the end, however, the metaphorical nature of this construct must not
be forgotten. Our society is not a carbon-based life form, and the DNA
metaphor inevitably breaks down when considering certain aspects of the
profoundly complex problem. The purpose of introducing the DNA metaphor
always was to facilitate thinking about the concept of variously labelled
systemic, structural, or institutional racism. When the DNA metaphor breaks
down, it frustrates its purpose and should quickly be abandoned. The point is
not to insist on the literal truth of a metaphor. The point is to advance and
inspire conversation.
The conversation in this Article has centered on Baltimore and its
pretrial legal system. Yet the lessons learned are generalizable. The
seemingly indestructible nature of inequality in Baltimore’s pretrial legal
system is symptomatic of similar inequalities in other systems, institutions,
and structures beyond Baltimore. Indeed, as recognized by Professor Sheryll
Cashin, “Baltimore is illustrative of a wider pattern, of a past and present of
investing in exclusionary areas and disinvesting in Black neighborhoods.
Other metropolitan regions with large populations of descendants are caught
in the same vicious cycle.”202 For better or for worse, Baltimore is not
atypical. Black butterflies and white Ls exist across America—though their
precise geographic shapes vary.
To confront the inequality represented by the Black butterfly, this
Article has argued that concerted cross-domain efforts are required.203
Focusing on bail alone will not address racism in policing practice; focusing
on policing alone ignores how racism in education affects the criminal legal
system; focusing on education misses the role that poverty plays. The
intersectional and cross-systemic nature of structural inequality demands
201. Cf. CASHIN, supra note 170, at 4 (“Each time the United States seems to dismantle a peculiar
Black-subordinating institution, it constructs a new one and attendant myths to justify the racial
order.”).
202. Id. at 9. For the very reason of Baltimore’s representativeness of the larger problem, Cashin
opens her extraordinary inquiry into the “three anti-Black processes that undergird the entire system
of American residential caste—boundary maintenance, opportunity hoarding, and stereotype-driven
surveillance” with an extended case study of Baltimore. Id. at 6, 9–37.
203. The fundamental importance of cross-domain connection to confront persistent underlying
systems also has methodological implications. This Article has therefore questioned the logic of
academic silos with its fetishizing of expertise. Instead of “staying in our lane,” we deliberately
looked beyond our field of specialization at BNIA indicators dealing with income, public
transportation, internet access, and more—even though we claim only lay knowledge of these areas.
We also experimented with geo-spatial analysis and novel visualizations.
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intersectional and cross-systemic responses. Bail reform is education reform
is economic reform is housing reform. And so on, and vice versa.
Perhaps “reform” is the wrong word. This Article has argued that radical
solutions are required and that the incremental change associated with
“reform” cannot succeed. As Professor Cashin puts it:
Healing a nation that began with, and still suffers from, white
supremacy requires abolition of the processes of residential caste
and repair in poor Black neighborhoods. To use the word
“abolition” is to acknowledge that we should seek enduring
transformation and not modest ephemeral reform. If the processes
of caste . . . are not abolished, we, like earlier generations of
Americans, will be leaving to future generations the undone work
of reconstruction and of reckoning with our nation’s original sin.204
Though critics may characterize those calling for the abolition of racist
institutions as unrealistic, we suggest that these critics have not grasped the
reality of structural inequality.205 Radical change does not need to mean
upheaval or violence, but it will require upsetting long established
hierarchies.
Of course, the need for radical change does not mean that local
interventions that could make a difference in day-to-day lives should be
abandoned. We do not advocate inaction on “small” matters until all “big”
problems are demolished. Thus, we do have recommendations concerning
Baltimore’s pretrial legal system. This most local of interventions centers on
judges.206 We have been critical of judges who follow an unwavering script
and reflexively detain defendants and reject defense lawyers’ arguments. In
our view, judges who detain more often than they release do dishonor to the
presumption of innocence and to the U.S. Supreme Court’s command that
detention should be a carefully limited exception to the rule of pretrial
release.207 At the same time, we recognize that judges sit in a difficult position
and that they need support from academics and others if they buck against
the dominant practice.208
204. CASHIN, supra note 170, at 202.
205. See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, Systemic Racism? Make Them Prove It., NAT’L REV. (Sept.
19, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/09/systemic-racism-criminal-justicesystem-make-critics-prove-charge/ (conservative critique); Thomas Ward Frampton, Essay, The
Dangerous Few: Taking Seriously Prison Abolition and Its Skeptics, 135 HARV. L. REV. 2013
(2022) (surveying discourse between prison abolitionists and skeptics).
206. Though we focus our pretrial-specific recommendations on judges, we recognize that other
pretrial actors have major roles to play. For instance, defense attorneys could be more active in
filing “bail appeals,” which are styled as habeas petitions in Maryland. Prosecutors and pretrial
services might also broaden their perspective and advocate more forcefully for pretrial release.
207. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
208. Without question, judges face structural challenges in making bail review decisions. They
proceed on a limited record. Though they can read the charging document, judges cannot question
the arresting officer or alleged crime victim at the hearing. Judges thus must rely upon a prosecutor’s
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Though statistically rare, the possibility of a released defendant
committing an egregious crime after being freed haunts every judge. As a
group, judges regard themselves as easy targets for media, the public, and
elected officials holding them responsible for having released the
individual—and ethical rules prohibit their responding to such attacks.209
Seeking reappointment or promotion and fearing criticism, most bail review
judges learn a basic maxim when first adorning the black robes: When in
doubt, incarcerate. People in power rarely complain when a judge holds
someone in jail; yet they become quite vocal and agitated when the person
released is charged with a new crime.
Because these dynamics all point towards incarceration, it is imperative
to support judges who act with courage when making unpopular but correct
release decisions. We need to help foster a public discourse where judges are
not pilloried based on rare and unfortunate instances of released pretrial
defendants committing horrid acts of violence. Instead, the public and those
in power need to be guided to understanding the far more common injustice
of unwarranted detention and how it exacerbates and reproduces structural
racism. Judges need help to decide to protect the weakest and most vulnerable
members of the community. While prosecutors and pretrial representatives
should more actively recommend pretrial release, judges certainly ought to
follow such recommendations more frequently than they do. Within
Baltimore’s pretrial system, it is the poorest defendant, usually a Black
person from a neighborhood oppressed in many ways, who is most likely to
remain incarcerated while awaiting trial.
Despite everything, hope remains. Though the pretrial system saw little
progress during the pandemic, prosecution patterns did meaningfully change
after a temporary moratorium on drug possession, prostitution, trespassing,
and other minor charges was followed by a major decrease in overall crime
in Baltimore.210 State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby subsequently announced
that the temporary hold on prosecutions would be made permanent. Her
office vowed to “decline prosecution of all drug possession, prostitution,
or Pretrial’s third-party account of what led to arrests. Similarly, judges must rely on defense- or
Pretrial-supplied information about defendants’ employment or community ties. In situations where
the defendant failed to appear at a prior court proceeding or is charged with committing a probation
violation, judges often lack court files and express strong reluctance to modify a colleague’s
previous “preset bail” ruling or to consider pretrial release for probationers. And then, of course,
there is the volume problem. Judges work under pressure to decide many cases in a limited period
of time.
209. See MD. R. 18-102.4(a) (“A judge shall not be swayed by public clamor or fear of
criticism.”); MD. R. 18-102.10(a) (“A judge shall abstain from public comment that relates to a
proceeding pending or impending in any court and that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome or impair the fairness of that proceeding . . . .”).
210. See Tom Jackman, After Crime Plummeted in 2020, Baltimore Will Stop Drug, Sex
Prosecutions, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-mdva/2021/03/26/baltimore-reducing-prosecutions/.
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minor traffic and misdemeanor cases, and [] partner with a local behavioral
health service to aggressively reach out to drug users, sex workers and people
in psychiatric crisis to direct them into treatment rather than the back of a
patrol car.”211 Though some critics voiced disapproval of these policy
changes, this decision shows that sensible and less punitive approaches to
criminal justice are possible. It also shows that cities can course-correct based
on data.
If change can happen in Baltimore, it can happen anywhere. Baltimore
is a city with famously intractable problems.212 Yet the problems seen in
Baltimore are simply the logical conclusion of trends seen elsewhere in the
United States. The structures of racism and inequality in Baltimore are really
distilled versions of an American pattern. The fight for justice—whether bail,
education, jobs reform, or any other connected struggle—must confront those
patterns. Structural racism has a Hydra-like quality. If you simply cut off one
head, two will grow back in its place. Only Herculean focus and a willingness
to burn out injustice across the whole monster can lead to meaningful change.

211. Id.
212. See generally PIETILA, supra note 163.

